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ABSTRACT 
The early 21st century will be remembered for its shift in global 
economic power dynamics.  Within three decades, China has 
fostered the growth of globally prominent firms and its capital 
market advanced as the world’s second most meaningful market.  
Chinese firms—many of which are subject to an illiberal, political 
governance—are increasingly integrated with the world economy, 
attracting domestic and global public investors.  Neither state 
ownership and control, political influence, nor weakly functioning 
legal institutions stand in the way of these firms’ access to capital.  
This reality challenges law and development theories and notions of 
corporate governance best practices. 
This Article discusses the puzzling allure of Chinese public firms 
to external suppliers of capital, while illuminating the functions of 
illiberal governance in Chinese firms through both the state’s and 
Communist Party’s capacities.  The Article shows how alongside its 
many obstructions, China’s illiberal governance system plays an 
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important role in promoting market regularity, providing investors 
with the assurances necessary to secure the flow of external finance.  
Implications for global investors and policymakers outside China 
are assessed against the backdrop of recent developments in U.S.-
China relations. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/1
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, China’s presence in the world 
economy has increased dramatically.  This Article focuses on 
China’s rising global financial integration and particularly, on the 
growing access of Chinese firms to foreign capital through public 
finance.1 
China’s capital market is now the second largest capital market 
in the world, with institutional investors from across the globe 
queuing up for investment licenses.  Chinese companies have long 
been able to access foreign capital beyond their geographical 
borders as well.  Hundreds of Chinese companies are listed for trade 
on U.S. stock exchanges, and over a thousand more trade on other 
prominent global stock exchanges.2 
This growing availability of external capital challenges many 
fundamental assumptions underlying modern law and 
development theories and notions of corporate governance best 
practices.  Scholars have long understood private ownership and 
liberal corporate governance as engines for growth and global 
expansion.  Yet many large Chinese firms with global presence 
feature forms of state control, and almost all globally prominent 
Chinese firms—whether they are private or state-controlled—are 
potentially subject to the political clout of the Chinese Communist 
Party.  The orthodox approach also holds robust legal institutions as 
a necessary precondition for external finance.  Yet China’s capital 
markets continue to expand and attract new firms and investors 
without the qualities of a well-functioning legal system.  Chinese 
public firms are thus able to raise capital in the absence of many of 
the attributes assumed necessary under widespread notions of 
corporate capitalism. 
What can explain this puzzle?  To date, scholars have failed to 
reconcile the rise of Chinese firms and their appeal to investors with 
conventional assumptions. 3   This Article contributes to this 
discussion.  Perhaps surprisingly, it finds answers to the puzzling 
allure of Chinese public firms in the functions of China’s illiberal 
corporate governance system. 
 
 1 Public finance is capital raised from public investors through the capital 
market. 
 2 See infra Part II.b. 
 3 See infra Part II.c. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/1
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Side by side with the embrace of conventional corporate 
governance mechanisms, a parallel and much stronger governance 
system operates in China.  Through both state and Communist Party 
capacities, this system employs carrots and sticks that ensure market 
regularity and support the growth of Chinese public firms and 
China’s economy more generally. 
Alongside its many obstructions, therefore, China’s illiberal 
corporate governance system plays an important role in providing 
investors with the assurances necessary to secure the flow of 
external finance. 
This Article makes several contributions.  First, in showing how 
illiberal, even political, governance affects the availability of external 
finance and supports the rise of public firms, the Article challenges 
conventional understanding about the disruptive effects of state 
ownership and politicized control. 
Second, the Article contributes to an important and timely 
foreign policy debate.  Recent shifts in global economic power 
dynamics and the rising calls for an economic decoupling from 
China have led policymakers worldwide to reassess the implications 
of China’s economic ascent on their own domestic markets.  Given 
the continuous appeal of Chinese firms to global investors, the role 
of illiberal governance in these firms and its impact on investors and 
the global financial system should be better understood and 
considered as part of policy debates. 
The Article unfolds as follows:  Part II contextualizes the puzzle.  
It contrasts the striking expansion of China’s capital market and the 
global rise of its public firms with conventional understandings of 
development and growth.  Part III provides a brief background of 
China’s conventional corporate governance system and explains the 
heightened potential for investors’ abuse.  Part IV reveals the 
operation of a parallel, alternative, and illiberal governance system.  
It shows how state and Party capacities employ carrots and sticks 
that promote market regularity and mitigate investment risks.  Part 
V discusses considerations for institutional investors and U.S. 
policymakers in the context of the current pitfalls in U.S.-China 
relations.  Part VI concludes. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
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II. THE PUZZLING RISE OF CHINESE PUBLIC FIRMS AND THEIR 
RISING INTEGRATION WITH GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS4 
Some aspects of China’s rapid economic ascend are more known 
than others.  China’s leading spot in the desired Fortune Global 500 
list, for example, had carried recent headlines.5  The prominence of 
state ownership and political influence among these firms, and in 
the Chinese market at large, has been at the focus of attention.6  Yet 
China’s place in the Fortune Global 500 list, impressive as it be does 
not say much about how Chinese firms are financed, nor to what 
extent they are integrated with global financial markets and into the 
global economy more generally. 
More revealing of these aspects, yet less often discussed, is the 
ability of Chinese firms to raise capital from public investors, 
whether domestically or outside China.  Having access to public 
finance is considered an important step in financial market 
development and has become particularly important in China, 
especially in sectors and industries where state support is funneled 
 
 4  This Article focuses on equity capital raised from public investors as an 
aspect of China’s increasing integration with financial markets.  Other forms of 
public finance are outside the scope. 
 5 In 2020, China topped the list with the largest number of firms (124 including 
mainland China and Hong Kong, excluding Taiwan), exceeding Western 
leadership of the list for the first time in history.  Alan Murray & David Meyer, The 
Fortune Global 500 is Now More Chinese than American, FORTUNE (Aug. 10, 2020,) 
https://fortune.com/2020/08/10/fortune-global-500-china-rise-ceo-
daily/[https://perma.cc/HA66-KSVN].  Note, however, Chinese firms still lag 
behind U.S. firms in terms of total revenue.  See Visualize the Global 500, FORTUNE, 
https://fortune.com/global500/2019/visualizations [https://perma.cc/UC3E-
2TBZ]. 
 6 Close to seventy-five percent of the Chinese firms on this list are formally 
owned by the Chinese government (forty-eight firms are owned by the central 
government, thirty-two by the local level of SASAC, and twelve firms are owned 
by state-owned financial institutions).  See Interpretation of the 2020 Fortune Global 
500 List of State-Owned Enterprises, Report by the State-Owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of the State Council, Aug. 11, 2020, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877938/n2879597/n2879599/c15347659/c
ontent.html [https://perma.cc/T2EW-EUFP].  Many other firms in the list are 
subject to the political clout of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) even without 
any state-ownership.  Haier Group, Huawei, and even Alibaba and Tencent are 
among the Fortune Global 500 firms that are arguably considered to have ties with 
the Party-state.  See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond 
Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665 (2015) (exploring 
the extent to which the state in China exerts control over large Chinese companies). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/1
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to preferred firms.7   Chinese firms can now raise public finance 
through China’s domestic capital market as well as expand their 
financing efforts through offshore financial markets. 
Better integration with global financial markets gives firms 
access to a broader base of public-financed capital.  Access to a 
broader base of capital impacts the growth potential of individual 
firms and the economy in which they trade and operate. 
a. China’s Capital Market Growth and Foreign Investments8 
Over the last decade, China’s capital market has seen largely 
constant and significant growth, as measured by the number of 
firms listed and by total market capitalization.  At the end of 2005, 
mainland China stock exchanges—the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE)—had 1,377 public 
companies with a market capitalization of 401.8 billion USD.  In 
2010, the number of listed firms reached 2,063 with a total market 
capitalization of 4.028 trillion USD.  By the end of 2019, China’s 
capital market reached a striking 3,777 firms listed, with a total 
market capitalization of 8.5 trillion USD.9 
The growth of China’s capital market is telling in relative terms 
as well.  In less than three decades, China’s capital market grew to 
be the second largest capital market in the world, 10  outgrowing 
 
 7 State-backed debt is still a meaningful source of financing even for China’s 
listed firms but is extended mainly to state-controlled enterprises.  Estimates 
suggest a median debt ratio of fifty percent among non-financial Chinese listed 
firms.  See Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A. Kim, Corporate Governance in China: A Modern 
Perspective, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 190, 203 (2015). 
 8 Unless stated otherwise, I use the term “capital market” in reference to equity 
capital (and specifically “A shares,” see infra note 20) on both mainland stock 
exchanges.  Most of the data in this section predates COVID-19.  The long-term 
implications of the pandemic are yet to be observed. 
 9 Data drawn from the World Bank, infra note 10. 
 10  See Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current US$) – China, 
United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, WORLD BANK 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=CN-US-JP-
DE-GB [https://perma.cc/GLR4-NTYM] (comparing total market capitalization of 
listed domestic companies in China with the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, 
and Germany); cf. Listed Domestic Companies, Total – China, United States, Japan, 
Germany, United Kingdom, WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO?locations=CN-US-
JP-DE-GB [https://perma.cc/GZ6J-GJYP] (comparing total number of listed 
domestic companies in the same countries). 
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veteran competing markets and representing 10.1 percent of global 
stock market capitalization.11 
Notwithstanding the preference by some Chinese firms to list 
offshore (mainly high-growth tech companies), the number of IPOs 
(Initial Public Offering) in China continues to rise,12 reaching 429 
IPOs in 2017, thirty-six percent of global IPOs.13  This is while the 
capital markets of other countries have been shrinking,14 and despite 
 
 11 Global market capitalization is the market value of all outstanding shares 
of all publicly traded companies.   China’s total market capitalization is second only 
to the United States’, whose market capitalization represents thirty-six percent of 
the global market capitalization.  Kim Iskyan, China’s Stock Markets Have Soared by 
1,479% Since 2003, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 6, 2016, 7:00 PM),   
http://www.businessinsider.com/world-stock-market-capitalizations-2016-11 
[https://perma.cc/SFW5-QX4J]; Which Countries Control the Global Stock Market?, 
BESPOKE (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.bespokepremium.com/think-big-
blog/which-countries-control-the-global-stock-market/[https://perma.cc/56BU-
BCAR] (basing its analysis on data compiled by Bloomberg). 
 12 A further boost is expected due to China’s new technology boards.  See, e.g., 
Xie Yu, IPO Frenzy Grips China’s Nasdaq-Style STAR Market, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-frenzy-grips-chinas-nasdaq-style-star-
market-11594893290 [https://perma.cc/47DY-YS48]. 
 13 There was a sharp decline in 2018 and a rise thereafter with 197 IPOs in 
2019.  See Global IPO Trends: Q4 2017, EY 15-18, 
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-
com/en_gl/topics/assurance/assurance-pdfs/ey-global-ipo-trends-q4-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4RMQ-2Q4M]; cf. Global IPO Trends: Q4 2019, EY 16-19, 
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/growth/ey-
global-ipo-trends-q4-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RNS-Y9UR].  Note, these 
numbers represent mainland China only, excluding IPOs of “Chinese firms” in 
Hong Kong.  The IPOs of Chinese firms comprise a substantial number of the Hong 
Kong IPO market.  See infra note 33.  After including IPO numbers in Hong Kong, 
greater China markets had 394 IPOs in 2020 thus far (Q3), forty-five percent of 
global IPOs.  See Evelyn Cheng, Chinese Companies Are Leading the IPO Rush Amid a 
‘Flight from Uncertainty,’ CNBC (Oct. 27, 2020, 12:18 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/27/chinese-companies-are-leading-the-global-
ipo-rush-amid-a-flight-from-uncertainty.html [https://perma.cc/WBZ3-MK2K]. 




2021] Illiberal Governance and the Rise of China's Public Firms 929 
China’s known stringent IPO approval system,15 and the relatively 
high cost of capital for Chinese issuers.16 
Extreme levels of oversubscription to Chinese domestic IPOs 
reflect high demand on part of public investors. 17   The rising 
demand by foreign investors is particularly striking.18 
Foreign investment in China’s capital market is still restricted 
and is facilitated mainly through China’s Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors scheme (QFIIs). 19   Under this scheme, 
selected foreign institutional investors receive a license from China’s 
 
 15 China’s current IPO system is gradually being replaced by a registration-
based system which relies on disclosure by companies and supervision on part of 
stock exchanges rather than on a stringent government review and approval 
process.  IPOs in the SSE and SZSE technology boards have already moved to a 
registration-based system.  The shift was recently acknowledged in the amendment 
to the PRC Securities law: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengchuan Fa [中华人
民共和国证券法] (Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China) (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, rev’d Oct. 27, 2005, 




 16 See Yiming Qian, Jay R. Ritter & Xinjian Shao, Initial Public Offerings Chinese 
Style (Jan. 13, 2021) (working paper), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3682089 
[https://perma.cc/52D7-K4KL]. 
 17  A simple Google search for the terms “China,” “IPO,” and 
“Oversubscription” produced thousands of media results reporting 
oversubscriptions in the IPO of individual firms.  See, e.g., Hudson Lockett, Chinese 
Water Brand’s IPO More than 1,000 Times Subscribed, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/cd431c24-e79c-40b7-af72-5a4ce559b7d2 
[https://perma.cc/27MY-HSRU]; China’s First IPO Under New Rules More than 
4,000 Times Oversubscribed, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://fr.reuters.com/article/china-ipo-subscription-idUSL3N1591S9 
[https://perma.cc/NNG2-65E6].  But see Qian et al., supra note 16 (noting the role 
of price restrictions in artificially boosting demand). 
 18  See Karen Yeung, Old RQFII Still Popular Despite New China Investment 
Channels, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 7, 2017, 4:08 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2101695/old-rqfii-
still-popular-despite-new-china-investment [https://perma.cc/K2G5-XJF3]. 
 19 A license-based foreign investment regime has been used since 2002.  The 
qualification requirements and the assigned quotas were revised from time to time.  
A separate program was approved in 2011 to facilitate the use of Renminbi held 
outside mainland China for investments in the domestic market—Renminbi 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors.  The QFII and RQFII schemes have been 
recently unified, and the quota regime was abolished in early 2020.  PBOC & SAFE 
Remove QFII / RQFII Investment Quotas and Promote Further Opening-up of China’s 
Financial Market, SAFE NEWS (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/2020/0507/1677.html [https://perma.cc/3CQ8-
DS5G].  For ease of reference, I refer to these programs together as QFII. 
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securities market regulator (China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, or CSRC) to invest in the common outstanding shares 
of Chinese firms that trade domestically in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges (“A shares”).20 
More than 400 foreign institutions from thirty-one countries 
have invested through this scheme since its initiation in 2002.21  Fifty 
of the currently licensed QFIIs (313 total) are American institutions.22  
This path was, until recently, subject to regimented investment 
quotas.  The recent removal of the QFII quota regime is expected to 
boost direct foreign investments into the Chinese capital market 
even further, 23  and to support China’s further integration with 
global financial markets. 
Additionally, China has developed mutual programs with other 
capital markets, dubbed “stock connect,” to increase mutual market 
access for retail and institutional investors outside the QFII license 
and quota scheme detailed above.  Currently, mutual stock connects 
exist with the stock exchanges of Hong Kong and London.24 
 
 20  For simplicity, when discussing foreign investment in China’s capital 
market, I only discuss investments in “A shares,” which are common shares of 
China-domiciled listed companies that trade on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges in Renminbi (the Chinese currency).  Alternatively, foreign investors 
interested in accessing China’s capital market can also purchase and trade “B 
shares” or “H shares.”  These share types trade in foreign currencies and are not 
subject to the QFII quota regime.  The market scope of B and H shares is relatively 
small and most foreign investments in China’s capital market today are done in A 
shares. 
 21  Abolish Restrictions on the Investment Quota of Qualified Foreign Investors 
(QFII/ RQFII) and Further Expand the Opening up of Financial Markets, SAFE NEWS 
(Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/2019/0910/1552.html 
[https://perma.cc/2TDC-TUNM]. 
 22 List of QFIIs (until Oct. 2019), CHINA SEC. REGUL. COMM’N (Oct. 23, 2019), 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/OpeningUp/RelatedLists/QFIIs/201912/
t20191223_368109.html [https://perma.cc/ZHR7-ELDU]. 
 23 CSRC , PBC, and SAFE Release the Measures for the Administration of Domestic 
Securities and Futures Investment by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors and RMB 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, CHINA SEC. REGUL. COMM’N (Sept. 25, 2020), 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/202009/t20200925_383
652.html [https://perma.cc/SD4L-Z4ZW]. 
 24 These mutual schemes include the Shanghai-Hong Kong and the Shenzhen-
Hong Kong stock connect initiatives, the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition 
of Funds, and the Shanghai-London Stock Connect Initiative.  The first two stock-
connect initiatives between the mainland and Hong Kong allow retail and 
institutional investors in each market mutual access to purchase shares listed in the 
other market, respectively.  Huang (Robin) Hui, “一国两制”背景下的香港与内地证
券监管合作体制：历史演变与前景展望  [The Prospect and Evolution of the 
Securities Regulatory Cooperative Regime between Hong Kong and Mainland 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/1
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Foreign demand for investment quotas in China’s capital market 
has further risen in recent years after several leading global indices 
and rating agencies, such as MSCI, FTSE Russell, and S&P, began 
including firms listed in China in their global equity indices.25  The 
inclusion of China’s A share firms in these global indices, and their 
growing weight in the indices,26 have boosted the financial exposure 
of foreign investors to China’s capital market through funds that 
follow these indices.27 
While the overall level of foreign investment in China’s capital 
market is still very small, assessed at about three percent of the total 
market,28 it is not due to low demand on part of investors.  The 
limited relaxation of Chinese restrictions on foreign investments, as 
detailed above, resulted in the growth of foreign investments in 
China’s capital market from 105 billion USD of capital assets in 2013 
 
China under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Arrangement], (Bijiaofa Yanjiu) [J. 
COMPAR. L.], no. 5,  2017 at 12.  The Shanghai-LSE stock-connect is additionally 
designed to enable the listing of firms from each market at Shanghai/LSE stock 
exchanges, respectively, through depositary receipts. 
 25  In 2018, both FTSE Russell and Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) Emerging Markets Index, have begun tracking China’s capital market and 
thereafter gradually increased the weight of Chinese A shares in their indices.  See 
China: Evolving the Emerging Markets Landscape, FTSE RUSSELL, 
https://www.ftserussell.com/index/spotlight/china-indexes 
[https://perma.cc/NJ7U-U9TS].; MSCI Announces the Results of the 2020 Annual 
Market Classification Review, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/market-classification 
[https://perma.cc/P4CZ-2EES]. 
 26 For example, Chinese firms listed in China (A shares) comprise thirty-three 
percent of MSCI’s emerging markets index.  Emel Akan, Leading Global Index Provider 
MSCI Has No Plans to Decouple from China, EPOCH TIMES (May 1, 2020), 
https://www.theepochtimes.com/leading-global-index-provider-msci-has-no-
plans-to-decouple-from-china_3334060.html [https://perma.cc/R5BB-96NL]. 
 27  See, e.g., Complete Guide to Chinese Share Classes & China ETF Investing, 
ETF.COM 3 (Feb. 2013), 
https://www.etf.com/docs/022013_IU_GuideToChineseShare.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MFY3-KSAZ] (noting ETFs’ (Exchange Traded Fund) exposure 
to China’s capital market per share type). 
 28  Liu Caiping & Timmy Shen, In Depth: Progress and Pitfalls for Foreign 
Investors in China’s Capital Markets, CAIXIN GLOBAL (Jun. 18, 2020, 8:28 PM), 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-06-18/in-depth-progress-and-pitfalls-for-
foreign-investors-in-chinas-capital-markets-101569516.html; cf. Narayanan 
Somasundaram, China’s Stock Market Rally Gets Extra Push from Foreign Investors, 
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to 594 billion USD by the first quarter of 2020.29  The U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission estimated that 586 American mutual 
funds are currently invested in China’s A share markets, with a 
dollar amount exposure of 37.2 billion USD.30  Interestingly, this 
investment scope had only risen amidst the so-called U.S. “economic 
decoupling” from China. 
b. China-Based Firms Accessing Global Financial Markets 
Access to public finance and the rising relevance of Chinese 
firms to foreign investors goes beyond China’s domestic market.  As 
China’s integration with global markets expands, so does the access 
of Chinese firms to global finance—a matter that now attracts the 
attention of policymakers.31 
Close to two thousand Chinese firms have issued their shares (or 
depositary receipts) for trade outside China.  These include Chinese 
companies incorporated in China and China-based companies that 
are incorporated outside mainland China but are commonly 
regarded as Chinese firms. 32   I refer to these firms hereafter as 
“China-based issuers.” 
 
 29 This includes equity capital and corporate bonds.  Nicholas R. Lardy & 
Tianlei Huang, Despite the Rhetoric, US-China Financial Decoupling is Not Happening, 
PETERSON INST. INT. ECON. (July 2, 2020, 11:15 AM), 
https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/despite-rhetoric-us-china-
financial-decoupling-not-happening [https://perma.cc/UVC2-SE4G]. 
 30 These estimates include only exposure to A shares by U.S. mutual funds.  
Other investment vehicles such as public and private pension funds, ETFs, and 
hedge funds are not included in these estimates.  U.S. Investors’ Exposure to Domestic 
Chinese Issuers, SEC DIV. ECON. & RISK ANALYSIS 4 (July 6, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/US-Investors-Exposure-to-Domestic-Chinese-
Issuers_2020.07.06.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY6T-V4EY]. 
 31 See infra Part V. 
 32 There are methodological differences in various studies and databases with 
respect to when a company is identified as a “Chinese company.”  The PRC 
Company law defines a PRC company as a company that is incorporated in China.  
The place of domicile is determined according to the company’s main registered 
office.  See infra note 153.  The USCC, for example, infra note 36, at 1, identifies a 
firm as a Chinese firm according to its principal executive office as reported in its 
U.S. filings.  Other firms based in China, while their place of incorporation and main 
office registered outside of China, are also commonly referred to as “Chinese 
companies.”  When identifying such firms as “Chinese firms,” analysts may 
consider the source of the firm’s assets or revenue: commonly a company would be 
considered China-based and thus viewed as a Chinese company, when the majority 
of its operating assets or revenues are sourced in China even while having its place 
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Approximately 1,150 companies out of the total number of firms 
listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange—a major international 
financial gateway—are ultimately Chinese issuers.  Chinese issuers, 
therefore, represent close to fifty-one percent of all firms listed in 
Hong Kong and seventy-one percent of total market capitalization.33  
Foreign investors can thus more freely increase their exposure to 
Chinese firms through the Hong Kong market. 
The second-most popular offshore listing destination for 
Chinese firms is the U.S. market.34  A Chinese firm issuing shares in 
the U.S. market can take one of two paths—issuing its shares as a 
“foreign issuer” or as a U.S.-domiciled entity. 
i. Chinese Firms as U.S. Foreign Issuers35 
Over 200 China-based U.S. foreign issuers are listed for trade on 
the three largest stock exchanges in the United States—Nasdaq, 
NYSE, and NYSE American,36 with a total market capitalization of 
 
of incorporation and domicile outside China.  Another common indicator is the 
identity of the company’s majority owners, controllers, and insiders. 
 33 Based on a total of 2,315 listed firms.  The fifty-one percent ratio includes 
Chinese firms that are listed in Hong Kong regardless of their domicile [i.e., China-
incorporated companies, issuers of H shares; P chip companies (firms incorporated 
outside China with more than fifty percent operating income sourced in China); 
and Red chip companies (firms incorporated outside China in which the Chinese 
government holds dominant, often controlling, ownership)].  See Ganggu Zhongzigu 
Baokuo Na ji Lei? [港股中资股包括哪几类?] (What Types of Hong Kong and Chinese 
Stocks are Included?), QQ SEC. NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017, 10:37), 
https://stock.qq.com/a/20171023/015733 [https://perma.cc/AL2L-Z4JE]. 
 34 For the distribution of total Chinese firms listed offshore, see Fengshua Pan 
and Daniel Brooker, Going Global? Examining the Geography of Chinese Firms’ Overseas 
Listings on International Stock Exchanges, 52 GEOFORUM 1, 4-5 (2014) (based on 1991-
2011 data, Chinese firms listed offshore preferred the exchanges in Hong Kong, the 
United States, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, in this order). 
 35  “The term foreign issuer means any issuer which is a foreign government, a 
national of any foreign country or a corporation or other organization incorporated 
or organized under the laws of any foreign country.”  17 C.F.R. §230.405 (2020); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.3b–4 (2020). 
 36 This number only accounts for China-based foreign issuers, thus excludes 
China-based issuers that are incorporated in the United States.  It also does not 
include firms that trade Over the Counter (OTC).  See U.S.-CHINA ECON. and SEC. 
REV. COMM’N, CHINESE COMPANIES LISTED ON MAJOR U.S. STOCK EXCHANGES (2020) 
[hereinafter USCC Report], https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
10/Chinese_Companies_on_US_Stock_Exchanges_10-2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NY5B-5AAD] (reporting on 217 Chinese firms listed in the 
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$2.2 trillion. 37   Interestingly, notwithstanding the recent 
deterioration of U.S.-China relations, seventy-nine of these 
companies have listed their shares in the United States in the past 
three years alone (2018-October 2020), representing 8.8 percent of 
total U.S. IPOs in the same period.38 
Some of the Chinese firms that list in the United States as foreign 
issuers are incorporated in China and thirteen such firms formally 
identify as national-level State-owned enterprises (SOEs), controlled 
by the PRC central government. 39   But most of these firms are 
ostensibly private firms that are incorporated outside China (mainly 
in Hong Kong or in tax havens such as Cayman Island and the 
British Virgin Islands) 40  and employ structures that make their 
identification as Chinese firms more difficult.41  Based on intricate 
 
United States, twenty-seven of them are U.S.-domiciled); cf, List of Chinese Companies 
that Trade on U.S. Stock Exchanges, STOCK MARKET MBA, 
https://stockmarketmba.com/chinesecompaniesthattradeonusexchanges.php# 
(last updated Nov. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/A97Z-UUXH] (including 276 total 
Chinese companies that are listed on the main boards as well as OTC, through both 
direct listings (approximately seventy-three) as well as ADRs (American 
Depositary Receipts, approximately 154)). 
 37 USCC Report, supra note 36, at 1. 
 38 The number of recent Chinese IPOs is drawn from the USCC Report, supra 
note 36, and is based on the year of IPO until October 2020.  In 2020, there has been 
a sharp decline of Chinese IPOs in the U.S. market and a parallel increase in the 
number of total U.S. IPOs.  These factors have reduced the percentage of new 
Chinese IPOs in the U.S. market over the three-year period from 12.2% (2017-2019) 
to 8.8% (2018-2020).  The total number of US IPOs is drawn from various media 
reports.  See, e.g., IPO Statistics, STOCK ANALYSIS, 
https://stockanalysis.com/ipos/statistics/[https://perma.cc/8H6P-CPHN]; cf. 
Stephen Grocer, Chinese Companies Flocked to U.S. Markets in 2018. The Trade War 
May Have Had a Role, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/business/dealbook/trade-war-china-
ipos.html [https://perma.cc/5W9U-TE6S]. 
 39 USCC Report, supra note 36, at 1 n.4.  State ownership and control in many 
of these offshore listed firms is likely much more pervasive than indicated by the 
formal directory relied upon in the report. 
 40  William J. Moon, Delaware’s Global Competitiveness, 106 IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 24-25) (identifying a total of 243 “Chinese 
corporations” as U.S. issuers, using the firms’ main registered headquarters and 
place of incorporation.  Out of the total, Cayman Islands were found to be the home 
of 62.1% of the firms, British Virgin Island 12.8%, and China only 4.5%). 
 41 USCC Report, supra note 36,  at 1 (noting the number of U.S.-listed Chinese 
firms does not reflect the full number of Chinese firms listed in the United States as 
some Chinese firms relay on offshore registration which makes tracking their China 
operations difficult). 
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structures,42 these firms can list offshore and gain access to foreign 
capital while keeping most of their operating assets (including 
licenses) with a China-domiciled company (an operating entity).  
Public investors have economic and decision-making rights in the 
operating entity based on contractual agreements with its owners.43 
ii. China-Based Firms as U.S.-Domiciled Issuers 
In addition to China-based U.S. foreign issuers, hundreds of 
firms were listed for trade in the U.S. market as domestic-U.S. 
firms,44 while their meaningful operating assets similarly remained 
in China.  Many of these firms entered the U.S. capital market in the 
late 2000s through a “back door listing” (also known as a reverse 
merger), which at that time was a common method for foreign firms 
to access the U.S. capital market.45  Through this method, a Chinese 
company merged into a U.S. publicly listed shell entity that had 
nominal or no operations and assets of its own.  The Chinese 
 
 42  A dominant structure employed by China-based U.S. issuers is the 
“Variable Interest Entity” structure (VIE), commonly used by firms that wish to 
raise foreign capital but operate in industries in which foreign ownership is limited 
according to Chinese law.  Commentators estimate that close to seventy percent of 
China-based firms that are listed for trade in the United States employ a VIE 
structure.  At its most basic level, the VIE structure opens access to foreign capital 
while sidestepping requirements for Chinese regulatory approvals by maintaining 
de facto control over licenses and operating assets with a Chinese entity (the VIE).  
Foreign investors hold shares in an offshore listed company that has little or no 
operating assets but may hold intellectual-property rights, domain names, etc. as 
well as profit sharing and voting rights in the Chinese operating company (the VIE) 
through contractual agreements (through an additional intermediary China-
domiciled wholly foreign owned entity).   On the structure and its purposes see 
Paul L. Gillis and Fredrik Oqvist, Variable Interest Entities in China, GMT RSCH. 
(March 13, 2019), https://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/2019-03-vie-
gillis.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2F2-NJM3]. 
 43  For a discussion about the associated risks for foreign investors, see 
BRANDON WHITEHALL, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, BUYER BEWARE: 
CHINESE COMPANIES AND THE VIE STRUCTURE (2017); U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV., 
2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 127-77 (2019). 
 44  Based on a 2019 Bloomberg search, Fried and Kamar found 220 U.S-
domiciled yet China-based firms listed in the U.S. market.  Jesse M. Fried and Ehud 
Kamar, China and the Rise of Law-Proof Insiders 1 n.5 (European Corp. Governance 
Inst., Working Paper No. 557/2020, 2020). 
 45 David K. Cheng, Cindy Zhu & David Lee, Reverse Mergers by China-Based 
CompaniesIs This the End?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jul. 11, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/reverse-mergers-by-china-
based-companies-is-this-the-end [https://perma.cc/36EF-BSKR]. 
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company then became a subsidiary of the U.S.-listed firm, which 
then ceased its shell status and resumed trade.  The original owners 
of the Chinese company typically received controlling interests in 
the U.S.-listed firm.  This organizational structure enabled access to 
the U.S. capital market without the regulatory approval process 
otherwise required for an IPO. 
Consequently, the entity that survives the merger passes as a 
domestic U.S. listed company for all regulatory purposes, even 
while most of its operating assets remain in China and while having 
PRC entities or individuals as its ultimate controlling shareholders 
and insiders.46 
c. The Puzzle 
The review above is intended to bring forth the ways through 
which Chinese firms (broadly defined) can raise public finance from 
foreign investors, both in China and through global markets, and the 
current scopes of such foreign investments. 
To clarify, access to foreign-sourced capital through the two 
pathways described above does not mean that China is completely 
integrated with global financial markets.  Far from it.  The Chinese 
government still controls cross-border financial flows. 
China’s foreign accounts control prevents the easy flow of 
capital in and out of China, and a pre-approval system for offshore 
listing poses challenges for firms seeking finance outside China.47  
 
 46 On litigations following claims against China-based reverse merger firms 
and their insiders, see id.  On the potential harmful effect of reverse mergers on 
investors’ value, see Bill Alpert & Leslie P. Norton, Beware this Chinese Import, 
BARRON’S (Aug. 28, 2010), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/SB5000142405297020430440457544981294318
3940 [https://perma.cc/NQJ4-758K]; cf. Charles M.C. Lee, Kevin K. Li & Ran 
Zhang, Shell Games: The Long-Term Performance of Chinese Reverse-Merger Firms, 90 
ACCT. REV. 1547, 1547-1589 (2015) (comparing the long-term performance of reverse 
merger listed firms, finding that Chinese reverse mergers are not inherently “toxic” 
and even outperform their peers, contrary to common critique). 
 47  Guowuyuan guanyu Gufenyouxian Gongsi jingway Muji Gufen ji Shangshi 
de tebie Guiding [国务院关于股份有限公司境外募集股份及上市的特别规定] 
(Special Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Floatation and Listing 
Abroad of Stocks by Limited Stock Companies) (promulgated by Ministry of Com., 
July 4, 1994), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/2002110005
0791.shtml [https://perma.cc/T6G4-U2JK].  Such requirements for pre-approval 
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Restrictions on the scope of foreign investments,48  limitations on 
foreign ownership in certain industries including in financial 
institutions and services,49 as well as the inability of foreign firms to 
issue and trade securities in China’s domestic capital market,50 are 
additional impediments.  While many of these have been gradually 
partially relaxed in recent years, they still hold back integration with 
global financial markets. 
 
play a major role in pushing firms to develop innovative structures for listing 
offshore without the need for such regulatory process (e.g., reverse mergers and 
VIEs). 
 48 See text accompanying supra notes 19-28. 
 49 China has recently relaxed some of its foreign ownership limitations in the 
financial industry.  See, e.g., Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda Jinrong ye duiwai Kaifangde 
youguan Jucuo [关于进一步扩大金融业对外开放的有关举措] (Relevant Measures to 
Further Expand the Opening Up of the Financial Industry) (promulgated by Office 
of the St. Council Fin. Stability and Dev. Comm., July 21, 2019), 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-07/21/content_5412293.htm 
[https://perma.cc/U3EY-A9CD].  Following these steps, PayPal was permitted to 
acquire a seventy percent equity ownership of Chinese GoPay; Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley were approved to increase their stakes in several joint venture 
financial institutions to fifty-one percent ownership; JP Morgan was permitted to 
establish a first of its kind Wholly Foreign-Owned (WFOE) financial futures firm; 
BlackRock received initial approval to establish a mutual fund WFOE; several 
foreign financial institutions pursued licenses to provide financial clearing services 
through joint ventures; and two American financial firms were licensed to conduct 
financial rating services with respect to China’s domestic institutions.  Nicholas R. 
Lardy & Tianlei Huang, Despite the Rhetoric, US-China Financial Decoupling is Not 
Happening, PIIE (July 2, 2020, 11:15 AM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-
economic-watch/despite-rhetoric-us-china-financial-decoupling-not-happening 
[https://perma.cc/8M8S-CK9R]. 
 50 But see the recent Shanghai—London Stock Exchange Connect which is said 
to enable the cross-listing of LSE public firms in Shanghai (through the issuance of 
depositary receipts) and vis’ versa.   So far, however, only one listing in the opposite 
direction was accomplishedthe cross listing of Huatai Securities Co. Ltd. (a 
Chinese firm listed in SSE and HKSE) on LSE.  Launch of the Shanghai-London Stock 
Connect: Joint Announcement made by CSRC and FCA, BAKER MCKENZIE FENXUN (June 
2019), 
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/07/launch-
shanghai-london-stock-connect [https://perma.cc/9REX-HPQL].  Another listing 
of a Shanghai listed company, China Pacific Insurance, one of China’s biggest 
insurance firms, has been recently granted an approval to cross-list on LSE.  Yujing 
Liu, China Approves Second Listing for Shanghai-London Stock Connect amid Strained 
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Nonetheless, the above reflects that global financial integration 
has accelerated. 51   The flow of public finance, as an aspect of 
financial integration, helps facilitate the expansion of Chinese firms, 
and supports China’s economic development and growth. 
The demand for public investments is clear; Chinese firms need 
external finance to grow.  Financial integration with global markets 
gives firms access to a broader base of capital, and the Chinese 
government is gradually accommodating such needs by relaxing 
prior access limitations. 
Yet, the supply side is more puzzling.  What attracts suppliers of 
finance to Chinese firms?  What sustains the allure of Chinese firms 
to foreign investors particularly?52  Such allure is puzzling especially 
considering fundamental assumptions underlying development 
orthodoxies and prevailing corporate governance theories. 
Conventional wisdom in these lines of literature holds private 
ownership as the key engine for the growth of firms and for deep 
capital markets,53 while state ownership and political influence in 
firms are deemed to be impediments.54  Relatedly, prevailing market 
theories view robust legal institutions—particularly those 
associated with investor protections—as preconditions for the flow 
of external finance.55  Where legal systems are weak and market 
 
 51 For a brief review of recent efforts to further enable foreign integration, see 
Karen Yiqin Fan, Peter Corne & Celine Zhang, Update on China’s Recent Liberalization 




 52 Foreign investors are different from most domestic Chinese investors in two 
main respectsthey invest mainly through sophisticated institutional investors 
(while the sheer number of domestic investors are retail investors), and they have 
various investment alternatives outside China that can substitute for their desired 
level of portfolio exposure to emerging markets (while Chinese investments in 
offshore markets is extremely limited). 
 53  MAXIM BOYCKO, ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT VISHNY,  PRIVATIZING RUSSIA 
(1995) (arguing that in order to achieve economic growth, firms should be de-
politicized, and the state should be distanced from ownership through 
privatization). 
 54 See Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be 
Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 521 (2001) (noting that government intervention might 
slow growth).  The argument is also supported by studies noted in Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 302 (2008). 
 55 This line of argument is known as the “Law and Finance” approach.  See 
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The 
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 431 (2008); Rafael La Porta, 
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forces are yet to be fully developed, it is argued, unmonitored 
corporate controllers and insiders will bleed-out corporations from 
cash and value.  Managerial opportunism, self-dealing, and the 
abuse of investors will push finance away. 
Four decades of economic development in China, however, 
challenge these fundamental assumptions.  Chinese firms with or 
without state ownership can now choose whether to raise public 
finance through China’s domestic capital market or to expand their 
financing efforts offshore.  In both paths, suppliers of capital do not 
shy away from Chinese firms. 
Popular views explain the appeal of Chinese firms to be the 
result of the irrationality of investors; a market frenzy causing a 
bubble; or investors’ fear of missing out. 56   Irrationality-type 
answers might explain the interest of speculative retail investors and 
their meaningful share in China’s capital market,57 but they seem ill-
suited for sophisticated foreign institutional investors.  Such 
investors are mainly guided by investment analyses as to China’s 
growth opportunities and by economic diversification rationale.58 
 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants 
of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1145 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 
1116 (1998).  For a similar study that addresses emerging markets and transitional 
economies, see Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COM. ECON. 595 
(2003).  Critiques of the approach are not lacking.  See, e.g., HOLGER SPAMANN, LAW 
AND FINANCE REVISITED (2008); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great 
Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON 
5 (2003). 
 56 See e.g., STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCKMARKET 118-153 (2003); Christopher 
A. Iacovella, Why Are American Investors Funding Chinese Fraud?, REALCLEAR POL. 
(Oct. 19, 2019), 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/10/19/why_are_american_inv
estors_funding_chinese_fraud_141540.html [https://perma.cc/5TEV-LR9M] 
(labeling such investors’ sentiments: “‘you can’t miss out on China growth’ 
narrative”). 
 57 For the relative sheer size of retail investors compared with institutional 
investments in each of China’s stock exchanges, see Tamar Groswald Ozery, LAW 
& POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CORPORATE CHINA: EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION IN MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT, Cambridge University Press (under contract), at Chapter 6. 
 58 Yun Li, Larry Fink Just Revealed how BlackRock is Going to Keep Growing at its 
Torrid Pace: China, CNBC (Apr. 8, 2019, 9:15 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/08/larry-fink-just-revealed-how-blackrock-is-
going-to-keep-growing-at-its-torrent-pace-china.html [https://perma.cc/72AQ-
J34F] (referring to Mr. Fink’s perspective of China as one of the largest future 
growth opportunities for BlackRock who aspires to become “leading global asset 
managers,” and BlackRock’s investments in China as a “diversified . . . long term 
investment solution”). 
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Presumably, if the risks are too high, foreign institutional investors 
have alternatives for portfolio diversification that would provide 
desired global exposure.  Furthermore, long term returns on 
investment do not seem exceptionally high for Chinese firms, and 
thus cannot alone substantiate a “high-risk high-gain” explanation 
in the secondary market.59 
Regardless of the rationale that motivates investors’ initial 
interest, the continuous growth of China’s capital market, supported 
by foreign finance, and the expansion of Chinese firms across global 
financial markets seem to reflect a message—state ownership and 
potential political control do not thwart foreign investors off 
Chinese firms. 
At the least, this reality suggests that foreign investors have 
developed “tolerance” to state ownership and political control and 
remain confident that they can benefit from investing in Chinese 
firms, and in China’s market more generally, regardless of these 
path-dependent features.  What is the source of investors’ 
confidence?  What explains the availability of public finance? 
Few studies have addressed this puzzle directly nor attempted 
to offer an explanation. 60   Theoretically, the continued allure of 
Chinese listed firms and the availability of public finance would not 
be so puzzling if the system that governs these firms is somehow 
superior despite heavy state ownership and control.  Investors’ 
confidence would be easily explained if investment in Chinese firms 
 
 59  See FRANKLIN ALLEN, JUN “QJ” QIAN, CHENYU SHAN & JULIE LEI ZHU, 
DISSECTING THE LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET 2 (2016) 
(finding a performance gap of A share listed firms relative to externally listed and 
unlisted Chinese firms, as well as to listed firms in comparative markets); cf. Qian 
et al., supra note 16, at 5 (observing excessive initial returns for 3 years following an 
IPO due to underpricing, then “lukewarm” long term returns).  High returns 
immediately following an IPO could explain IPO oversubscriptions but is more 
problematic when trying to understand continuous availability of capital in the 
secondary market. 
 60 Numerous related studies address different aspects in China’s economic 
growth puzzle.  See infra notes 161 & 166.  In the legal context, a few notable studies 
include: Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Right Hypothesis: The China 
Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 97 (2003) (resolving some aspects of the puzzle 
through a distinction between property rights and contract rights: “a reasonable 
assurance to would-be investors that the fruits of their investment will not be 
confiscated unpredictably is far more important to economic development than a 
formal legal system that enforces contract rights.”); Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz 
to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of Chinese Growth for the Law and Development 
Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 551, 551-602 (2009); and more generally, John 
K.M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxies 
and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 219 (2007). 
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does not entail particularly significant risks.  Perhaps corporate 
culture in China is uniquely not susceptible to investor abuse. 
Alternatively, notwithstanding state ownership and control and 
the particular risks that may or may not emanate from such features, 
investors’ confidence could be explained if their interests are 
sufficiently protected.  Perhaps something, somewhere along the 
system, balances-off or at least mitigates potential investment risks 
to acceptable levels. 
To consider these possibilities, I now turn to discuss some of the 
organizational and governance attributes commonly found in 
Chinese public firms, whether listed domestically or offshore.  I 
illuminate potential risks for public investors and discuss examples 
that reflect the inability of conventional corporate governance 
mechanisms to mitigate such risks, before considering other 
explanations for the puzzle in Part IV. 
III. CONVENTIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS 
WEAKNESSES 
Publicly listed firms in China emerged in the early 1990s through 
an industrial reorganization process known by scholars as China’s 
“corporatization without privatization.”  Corporatization meant 
reorganizing State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as one of the three 
corporate forms that were recognized in China’s newly enacted 
Company Law.61  The process, at least formally, also intended to 
gradually shift the control over state assets from the state, as the 
absolute owner of industrial enterprises, to professional managers.  
The new corporations embraced a “modern enterprise system” by 
adopting attributes of advanced corporations elsewhere, including 
corporate legal personhood, limited liability, and transferability of 
rights.  A U.S.-style separation between ownership and 
management was formally adopted.  Social welfare functions that 
were the responsibility of enterprises under the planned economy 
were removed, and shares were issued to signify the ownership 
interest of the state. 
 
 61 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa [中华人民共和国公司法] (The 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China), (promulgated by Standing 
Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, last amended Oct. 26, 2018, effective 
Oct. 26, 2018) [hereinafter “the Company Law” or “2005 Company Law”]. 
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Almost simultaneously, these now-corporatized SOEs turned to 
China’s newly established stock exchanges to raise capital.  They 
issued their shares to domestic and foreign investors, while 
strategically refraining from privatization and maintaining a 
substantial block of shares, and often control, with the state.62  With 
time, pyramid holding groups and mixed ownership structures 
were created around many of China’s corporatized and now-listed 
“SOEs,” diluting the state’s direct share ownership while preserving 
its control rights. 
A pyramid group structure is common around the world.  This 
organizational structure enables controlling shareholders to issue 
stocks to the public while maintaining and even enlarging their 
voting control relative to their cash flow rights through a holding 
company.63  Mixed-ownership is a more novel ownership structure 
that combines the equity stakes of private shareholders with state-
holdings in the same firm.  Like the public listing of subsidiaries in 
holding group structures, mix-ownership was branded as a plan to 
“privatize” Chinese SOEs,64 but in fact only entrenched the state as 
a controlling shareholder in many such “privatized” firms. 
 
 62 Jiang & Kim, supra note 7, at 191-92. 
 63  Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of 
Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 82 (2000). 
 64 Defined as: “cross-shareholdings by, and mutual blends of, state-owned 
capital, collective capital, and non-public capital.”  Zhongguo gongchandang di 
shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao [中国共产党第十八
届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报] (Decision of the Cent. Comm. of the Communist 
Party of China on Several Major Issues of Comprehensively Deeping Reform) 
(promulgated by the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Cent. Comm. of the 
Communist Party of China, Nov. 12, 2013), [hereinafter Communique 2013] 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-
01/15/content_31203056.htm [https://perma.cc/736B-WGDK].  This was 
followed by detailed CCP decisions to guide central and local state organs 
(including the NPC and the State Council on its various ministries) on how to 
implement and pursue the mixed ownership goal. Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu 
Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding [中共中央关于全面
深化改革若干重大问题的决定] (Decision on Certain Major Issues Concerning the 
Comprehensive Deepening of Reform) (promulgated by the Central Comm. 
Communist Party China, Nov. 15, 2013) [hereinafter The 3rd Plenum Decisions of 
2013], http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1115/c64094-23559163.html 
[https://perma.cc/AQX9-2UFJ].  See generally DANIEL H. ROSEN, AVOIDING THE 
BLIND ALLEY: CHINA’S ECONOMIC OVERHAUL AND ITS GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS (2014) 
(providing critical analysis). 
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At the outcome of these processes, the Chinese Party-state65—
including central and local governments, ministries, and other state 
bodies—retained, and in fact, leveraged, its ultimate control over 
numerous listed companies.66  The prevailing corporate ownership 
structures in China, therefore, enable organs of the central and local 
government, through holding-companies and mixed-ownership, to 
maintain their controlling positions in many firms even while 
sometimes holding only a minority stake directly. 
Naturally, the state operates through powerful human 
appointees as corporate insiders—a fact that introduces monitoring 
challenges and abundant opportunities for the abuse of public 
shareholders, affecting both their governance and economic rights.  
These ownership structures are also potentially self-perpetuating.  
They help entrench controlling parties in ways that muddle the 
prospect for shareholder-rights reform. 
I now turn to explain how these structures turned conducive to 
various forms of investors’ abuse.  Importantly, these ownership 
structures and their consequent attributes characterize many of 
China’s publicly listed firms.  The implications apply across China’s 
business sector and extend onto public firms with minimal to no 
state ownership, whether they are listed for trade domestically in 
China or offshore. 
a. Concerns for Public Investors 
i. Excess Opportunities for Self-Dealing by Agents 
Where ownership is concentrated the dominant shareholder is 
the main beneficiary of any value increase in the firm.  The dominant 
shareholder is, therefore, assumed to be best incentivized to monitor 
the behavior of corporate managers and other insiders.  With 
 
 65 The term “Party-state” refers to a one-party system in which one political 
party directs both the political process and the administrative governance of the 
state. 
 66 As part of the Mixed-ownership scheme, for example, the number of listed 
firms owned by either the central or local government has increased from 344 to 368 
for central firms and from 662 to 700 for local firms.  Hao Chen & Meg Rithmire, 
The Rise of the Investor State: State Capital in the Chinese Economy, 55 STUD. COMPAR. 
INT’L DEV. 257, 263 (2020).  For a more general discussion of the market structure 
and state dominance during the corporatization period, see Liufang Fang, China’s 
Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 149, 224-228 (1995). 
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abundant inside information, dominant shareholders can also 
efficiently preempt market reactions by identifying managerial slack 
early and simply replace ill-performing managers. 
Where the government is the dominant shareholder, however, 
no ultimate real principal exists at the top of the state’s holdings.  
There is no real principal who would personally benefit from 
monitoring and thus no one with the incentive to monitor the 
behavior of corporate managers.  This structural predicament 
became known in China as the “absentee principal” or the “absent 
owner” (suoyouzhe quewei). 67   This situation leads to the relative 
apathy of government officials toward corporate misconduct, even 
though in theory, as the representatives of the controlling-state 
shareholder, they should have been those most interested in curbing 
corporate malfeasance.68 
Consequently, firms in China became controlled by 
unmonitored powerful insiders (neiburen kongzhi).  Related party 
transactions facilitated vast self-dealing not only by the insiders 
themselves but also by the agents assigned by the state to supervise 
them.69  The modern corporate form employed in SOEs, therefore, 
became conducive not only to self-dealing but to corruption as 
well.70 
Various organizational schemes at the state-level were 
introduced to deal with these structural predicaments with respect 
to SOEs.  Primary among them was the 2003 establishment of a 
 
 67  Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 4 CHINA 
ECON. REV. 494, 499 (2003). 
 68 Id. at 498 (“Yet calls for government-owned enterprises to be independent 
of government ‘interference’ are calls for nothing short of utter nonaccountability 
for management.”). 
 69 Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 148 (2006) (“[A] 2002 study of corporate governance by the 
CSRC and the SETC revealed, on the basis of self-reporting alone, that forty percent 
of listed companies engaged in related-party transactions with their top ten 
shareholders.”); see also Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas C. Howson, Pathway to 
Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, in 
THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243, 
248 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) (“‘Tunnelling’ by individual insiders and 
controlling shareholders, both state and non-state, by means of related-party 
transactions is notorious; in 2002 tunnelling by controlling shareholders was 
estimated at 96.7 billion yuan, equivalent to the total amount of money raised in 
stock markets in the same year.”); Ming Jian & T. J. Wong, Propping Through Related 
Party Transactions, 15 REV. ACCT. STUD. 70, 98 (2010) (finding that abnormal related 
sales propping done for the benefit of the controller is more prevalent among state-
owned firms and in regions with weaker economic institutions). 
 70 See infra, Part IV. B.1. 
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national state-asset management agency71—the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission [SASAC].  SASAC 
was designed to function as a unified national, ministry-level agency 
that will shoulder the State Council’s (the central Chinese 
government) role as a shareholder, including in the monitoring of 
corporate insiders and in exercising shareholder governance 
rights. 72   Yet, the agency faces strong resistance from various 
interested parties within China’s political-economic system that 
weaken its authority:  other national-level ministries with a say in 
relevant industries compete with SASAC on regulatory powers.73  
Some of the firms under its supervision and apparent control are 
also ministry-level, economically powerful industry behemoths, 
which can challenge its supervision and enforcement capacities.74  
Furthermore, SASAC exercises its governance powers, and 
particularly its control rights in management, in the shadow of an 
overall Communist Party control.75  More recently, this control has 
been formalized and institutionalized into the governance of 
corporatized SOEs and firms more generally, 76  a change that is 
further undermining the corporate capacity and administrative 
authority formally reserved to SASAC. 
 
      71 The formal capacity of SASAC to act as the shareholder on behalf of the 
state was established in law only six years after the agency was created.  Zhonghua 
Renming Gongheuo Qiye Gouyou Zichan Fa [中华人民共和国企业国有资产法] 
(Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises) 
(promulgated by Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong. Oct. 28, 2008, 
effective May 1, 2009), arts. 1, 3, [hereinafter SOE Assets Law] 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=7195&lib=law [https://perma.cc/ZY2Z-
266B]. 
 72  Main Functions, SASAC, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170831013424/http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408028
/n1408521/index.html (last visited May 24, 2019). 
 73  See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: 
Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 726-
28 (2013) 
 74 Id. at 736. 
 75 Id. at 737-38 (referring to this relationship as “a highly institutionalized 
sharing arrangement between the Party and SASAC.”). 
 76  See generally Tamar Groswald Ozery, The Politicization of Corporate 
Governance—A Viable Alternative?, AM. J. COMPAR. L. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 15-45) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3608727  (discussing the 
recent “politization of corporate governance” in China, in which political 
institutions with corporate governance functions have been institutionalized both 
internally and externally to firms). 
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At the crossroad of these competing forces are the corporate 
insiders and Party-state affiliated individuals who stand to gain 
from the disarray of conflicting institutional interests.  The 
separation of ownership and control during the corporatization 
process imported the paradigmatic vertical agency problem into a 
system with an already complex range of idiosyncratic institutional 
monitoring challenges. 
State corporate control in China, therefore, features the same 
type of insider self-dealing concerns that the paradigm agency costs 
analysis envisages, yet it amplifies the problem by reproducing the 
links (agents) in the chain that can exploit the situation while 
weakening those with direct incentives to limit it.  This is an 
exacerbated form of the well-known corporate monitoring 
predicament—“who monitors the monitors?”77 which multiplies in 
China across layers of agents inside and outside the firm.78 
Even in the private sector—China’s business elite and its 
political elite are highly interconnected through dependencies on 
network relations, political incentives, and career trajectories.79  The 
comingling of interests supports corruption and reduces the 
incentives to monitor and enforce against corporate wrongdoing in 
the private sector as well. 
 
 77 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case 
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 835-836 (1981) 
(discussing this question as part of the costs of the separation between ownership 
and control). 
 78  See Tamar Groswald Ozery, Minority Public Shareholders in China’s 
Concentrated Capital Markets—A New Paradigm?, 30 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 11 (2016). 
 79 See Alex Bryson, John Forth & Minghai Zhou, How Much Influence Does the 
Chinese State Have over CEOs and Their Compensation?, in INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION 1 (Jaime Ortega ed., 2014) (finding that government 
involvement in the appointment of senior management extends beyond state-
owned firms into privately owned firms and across industrial sectors).  Milhaupt & 
Zheng, supra note 6, at 684 (identifying ninety-five out of the top one hundred 
private Chinese firms by revenue and eight out of the top ten internet firms to be 
controlled by a current or former member of a central or local political 
organization). 
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Empirical research points to the prevalence of tunneling in 
Chinese public firms,80 whether state or privately owned.81  The use 
of related party transactions, particularly intra-group transfers and 
loan guarantees,82 which shift resources from publicly listed firms to 
related parties, are especially noted in these studies.83 
These excess opportunities for self-dealing and tunneling affect 
the governance of China’s public firms and increase the potential 
harmful effect on firm value at the expense of public investors in 
these firms. 
 
 80 Value extraction by corporate controlling shareholders at the expense of 
minority shareholders received the name “tunneling.”  For the seminal works on 
tunneling, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling 
Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003), and Simon Johnson, Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 
22 (2000). 
 81 See, e.g., Kun Su, Liuchuang Li & Rui Wan, Ultimate Ownership, Risk-taking 
and Firm Value: Evidence from China, 23 ASIA PAC. BUS. REV. 10 (2017) (examining the 
results of risk taking and ownership structure in Chinese listed firms and finding 
that the presence of ultimate controlling shareholder, and the divergence between 
its control right and cash flow right through pyramid structures, lead to lower 
corporate risk-taking and firm value); Kun Wang & Xing Xiao, Controlling 
Shareholders’ Tunneling and Executive Compensation: Evidence from China, 30 J. ACCT. 
PUB. POL’Y 89 (2011) (discussing how tunneling by controlling shareholders reduces 
the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and suggesting that 
controlling shareholders have less interest to strengthen pay for performance 
measures due to their ability to extract value through private benefits of control). 
 82 See Guohua Jiang, Charles M.C. Lee & Heng Yue, Tunneling through Inter-
Corporate Loans: The China Experience, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (discussing the scope of 
abuse by controlling shareholders through the use of intercorporate loans between 
1996–2006); Qiao Liu & Zhou (Joe) Lu, Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Management in the Chinese Listed Companies: A Tunneling Perspective, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 
881 (2007) (finding evidence which suggests that controlling shareholders use 
earnings management to tunnel); cf Winnie Qian Peng, K.C. John Wei & Zhishu 
Yang, Tunneling or Propping: Evidence from Connected Transactions in China, 17 J. 
CORP. FIN. 306 (2011) (corroborating tunneling in financially sound firms but 
showing that controlling shareholders also employ connected transactions to prop 
up firms in financial distress and support their stability). 
 83 See, e.g., Nan Jia, Jing Shi & Yongxiang Wang, Coinsurance within Business 
Groups: Evidence from Related Party Transactions in an Emerging Market, 59 MGMT. SCI. 
2295 (2013) (discussing the results of a transaction-level study that demonstrated 
evidence of a “coinsurance” effect among Chinese business group); Henk Berkman, 
Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. Fu, Expropriation Through Loan Guarantees to Related 
Parties: Evidence from China, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 141 (2009) (examining loan 
guarantees among public traded Chinese firms and finding evidence of firms 
expropriating minority-shareholder wealth). 
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ii. Potential State “Expropriation” 
As if the above features of corporate organization in China are 
not challenging enough, investors in corporatized SOEs face further 
difficulties due to a potential clash of interests with the state as the 
controlling shareholder in many of these firms. 
It is well established that controlling shareholders can promote 
their interests more easily by enlarging their voting control relative 
to their cash flow rights.84  This can be done through deploying legal 
structures, such as pyramidal ownership, dual-class shares, cross-
shareholdings within business groups, voting agreements, and 
other business arrangements.85  The result (and often the aim) of 
these ownership structures is the dissociation of public investors 
from governance, which allows the controller to extract private 
benefits of control more freely.86  In the case of state control, such 
“tunneling” may serve benevolent purposes but does not change the 
potential economic outcome at the firm level. 
Increasing the state’s voting control disproportionately to its 
cash flow rights was actively pursued in China throughout its 
market transition and until the present day—from the inception of 
its corporatization process with SOEs that raised passive equity 
 
 84 See generally Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan & Larry H.P. 
Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholding, 57 J. 
FIN. 2741 (2002); Claessens et al., supra note 63 (analyzing the separation of 
ownership and control across 2,980 East Asian corporations). 
 85 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George G. Triantis, 
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency 
Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE 
OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000) (explaining the separation of 
shareholder control from cash-flow rights resulting from dual class share 
structures, cross-ownership ties, and stock pyramids). 
 86  Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006) 
(“increased productivity accrues to shareholders in proportion to their equity, 
while private benefits of control are allocated based on governance power”).  But 
see Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 
YALE L.J. 560 (2016) (suggesting that entrepreneurs value corporate control because 
it allows them to pursue their vision the way they see fit, rather than necessarily to 
reap private benefits at the expense of public shareholders).  With respect to China, 
see Jiang, Lee & Yue, supra note 82 (finding that the use of intercorporate loans by 
controlling shareholders to siphon funds from publicly listed companies is most 
severe in firms where the controlling shareholders’ governance rights are larger 
than their ownership (cash flow) rights). 
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capital while keeping state shares non-tradeable, 87  through the 
reorganization of these firms into larger pyramid holding groups, 
and to the recent waves of M&A activity that reduced the number 
of state owned enterprises but enhanced their scope.88 
Instead of relaxing ownership structures in SOEs in ways that 
would better align the interests of the state with those of other 
shareholders, the Party-state has opted to further deepen the gap 
through its mixed-ownership scheme.89  This corporate organization 
scheme entrenches the state as a controlling (sometimes controlling-
minority) shareholder in many such “mixed” firms.90 
Interestingly, the state holds more than twenty percent 
ownership in only fourteen percent of China’s publicly listed firms 
(506 firms in 2018).  Yet these firms account for forty percent of total 
market capitalization and fifty-six percent of the listed companies’ 
total revenues.91  Furthermore, the state is the ultimate controller in 
thirty-one percent of China’s publicly listed firms (1,101 companies, 
of which 395 ultimately controlled by the central government and 
706 by local governments).92 
 
 87 See generally Nicholas C. Howson, Protecting the State from Itself? Regulatory 
Interventions in Corporate Governance and the Financing of China’s ‘State Capitalism’, in 
REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE 
CAPITALISM, 49 (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2015); Clarke, supra 
note 67, at 496-497. 
 88 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, The Global Financial Crisis and China’s Domestic and 
International Political Options, in CHINA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A 
COMPARISON WITH EUROPE 3, 5 (Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Jean-Francoise Di Meglio & 
Xavier Richet, 2012) (pointing out that between 2003 and 2010, the total number of 
SOEs dropped from 159,000 to 114,500, but the total assets of 121 large national 
SOEs managed by SASAC increased from three trillion to twenty trillion yuan). 
 89 On the current promotion of a “mixed ownership economy,” see discussion 
supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 90 Chen Yanqing, Difang Guozi ru zhu Minqi zai xian gaochao: Jinnian chao 10 jia 
minying A gu Gongsi jiang Bianshen Guoqi [地方国资入主民企再掀高潮:今年超 10 家
民营 A 股公司将变身国企] (Local state-owned assets take over private enterprises and set 
off another climax: more than 10 private A-share companies will become state-owned this 
year), TENCENT NEWS: SECURITIES (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://stock.qq.com/a/20181009/009345.htm [https://perma.cc/FP9X-L3YK]. 
 91 See Daniel H. Rosen, Wendy Leutert & Shan Guo, Missing Link: Corporate 
Governance in China’s State Sector, ASIA SOC’Y & RHODIUM GRP. 12 (2018). 
 92 Id.  The authors do not mention how “ultimate control” was identified but 
rely on third-party commercial vendors for such determination.  The 2005 PRC 
Company Law, supra note 61, art. 216(2) defines a “controlling shareholder” as: a 
shareholder whose capital contribution accounts for more than fifty percent of the 
total equity stocks, or a shareholder whose capital contribution or proportion of 
stock is less than fifty percent but who enjoys a voting right large enough to have a 
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Similarly, in recent years, the state has expanded its reach into 
the operations of private firms also by offering “itself as financier to 
the private sector.”93  Thus, although public finance became a more 
available option for private firms as well, and the ratio of 
corporatized listed-SOEs in the market has decreased, the breadth 
of the state’s market reach has expanded. 
In its capacity as a shareholder, the state is assigned corporate 
governance rights that are at least in principle more extensive than 
those granted to shareholders by the Company Law.94  To note, the 
state’s corporate capacity is not without reins, however.  Its 
shareholding capacity is exercised formally through the 
shareholders’ assembly following defined corporate procedures and 
 
significant impact upon the resolution of the shareholders’ meeting or the 
shareholders’ assembly.  Art. 216(3) further defines an “actual controller” as: 
“anyone who is not a shareholder but is able to hold actual control of the acts of the 
company by means of investment relations, agreements or any other 
arrangements.” 
 93 Chen and Rithmire, supra note 66, at 264 (examining the growing reach of 
the state through various forms of capital investments in privately owned firms); 
see also Chen, supra note 90 (describing how the state “rescues” financially 
distressed private firms through share acquisitions).  See generally Nicholas R. 
Lardy, THE STATE STRIKES BACK: THE END OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA? (2009). 
 94 A few examples illustrate this point.  First, state bodies performing the 
contributor (i.e., investor) functions have the power to propose directors and 
supervisors to the shareholders’ meeting in any “state invested enterprise” 
regardless of the ratio held by the state, to assess the candidates to be appointed or 
proposed, as well as to determine the “standards of remuneration for managers . . .  
appointed by it.”  Compare SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, arts. 5, 22(3), 24, 27, with 
2005 Company Law, supra note 61, arts. 37(2), 39, 101, 102.  Second, the state is 
granted a de-facto veto right on the transfer of state-assets (e.g., state shares) of any 
state-invested enterprise.  This gives the state a veto right in transactions that 
otherwise would have been at the purview of the board.  See SOE Assets Law, supra 
note 71, at Sec. 5 (Transfer of State-owned Assets) (particularly arts. 51, 53).  See Lin 
& Milhaupt, supra note 73, at 743 n.135 (noting the need for SASAC’s approval of 
share transfer in a subsidiary and related court judgements).  Finally, beyond 
conventional company law fiduciary obligations, the SOE Assets Law specifically 
includes what seems as a fiduciary obligation of directors, supervisors, and senior 
managers not only to the company but specifically to the interests of the state as a 
shareholder: “[t]he directors, supervisors and senior management in state invested 
enterprise  . . . shall not (otherwise) damage the rights and interests of the state’s 
asset contributor”; and also determining liability for actions that causes losses of 
state-owned assets, including administrative accountability when such office 
holders are also state functionaries.  See SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, arts. 26 & 
71. 
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is therefore subject to potential scrutiny and corporate governance 
limitations.95 
To the extent that the state can incentivize its agents—both the 
professional managers appointed to operate state-invested publicly-
listed firms and the officials assigned to monitor insiders—to pursue 
the state’s goals rather than their own selfish interests, the benefits 
to the firm and its other stakeholders (particularly public 
shareholders) might be marginalized.  Whichever goal ends up 
being prioritized, it will not necessarily align with the most efficient 
and productive way of operation. 
Thus, even under an assumption of benevolent, well-
coordinated, state asset management, as a controlling shareholder 
the state may direct the firm in pursuit of objectives that simply run 
counter to the interest of the individual firm as a profit-maximizing 
business. 96   Examples of this in China include the use of state-
controlled firms to advance geopolitical goals without sound 
expectations for economic return; 97  harnessing control over 
 
 95 The reins are enshrined in both law and political economy.  For example, 
the SOE Assets Law make clear that the state in its shareholder capacity will follow 
the Company law procedures for shareholder deliberation and voting even with 
respect to major corporate decisions.  See e.g., SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, arts. 
13, 30, 33, 46.  The law also proclaims to guarantee operating autonomy and limits 
intervention in day-to-day decision making.  Only in limited circumstances, and 
only when the state is a sole or controlling shareholder, should the issues first be 
reported or approved by the relevant department of the local people’s government.  
See id. arts. 16, 24, 34, 40, 53 (transfer of state assets that would result in losing 
control).  With respect to decision in other state-invested enterprises, prior 
government approval may be required when relevant provisions exist in other laws 
and regulations.  Id. art 35.  For political-economic reins on the state’s capacity as a 
shareholder, see Groswald Ozery, supra note 57, at Chapter 6. 
 96  For examples, see discussion infra notes 97-100.  There are of course 
situations in which a state controlling shareholder will act as a profit maximizing 
investor.  The state as an economically oriented investor is expected to be a 
relatively passive investor (such as in its sovereign wealth fund capacity e.g., the 
China’s National Social Security Fund, China Investment Corporation, and other 
state-owned capital investment enterprises). 
 97 These examples include the use of controlled firms for geopolitical goals as 
part of the One Belt One Road Initiative.  Many of these projects are criticized for 
being economically senseless but nevertheless pass corporate governance 
approvals (even in private firms).  See Jenni March, The Rise and Fall of a Belt and 
Road Billionaire, CNN (Dec. 2018), 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/12/asia/patrick-ho-ye-jianming-cefc-
trial-intl/ [https://perma.cc/U96S-EP9J]; Wendy Wu, How the Communist Party 
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management to accelerate market reforms,98 or to influence or even 
control market volatility; 99  and using state-controlled firms to 
advance broad social goals or to carry ad-hoc social tasks, as seen 
recently when firms were mobilized to shift production lines to 
combat the spread of COVID-19.100 
Prioritizing state interests is easier when the state’s holding ratio 
in the firm is higher.  Yet notably, private firms can still be enlisted 
or at least pressured to contribute to national goals in a similar 
manner even with minority or no state ownership. 101   The SOE 
 
 98 Michael Firth, Chen Lin & Hong Zou, Friend or Foe? The Role of State and 
Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in China, 45 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 685, 692, 699–704 (2010) (reflecting that managers of listed 
SOEs easily passed generous compensations to investors as part of a structural 
reform in the capital market, even when such decisions were against the  economic 
interest of the firm, due to pressures to implement the reform quickly). 
 99 During the 2015-2016 market downturn, buy-sale orders of state-controlled 
insurance firms and financial institutions were directed by the Party-state to control 
market volatility.  Gabriel Wildau, China’s ‘National Team’ Owns 6 Percent of Stock 
Market, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/7515f06c-939d-
11e5-9e3e-eb48769cecab [https://perma.cc/2A9X-G6NA].  Ad-hoc trade 
suspensions to control supply and demand and stabilize the market where traders 
are called to heed “political consciousness” amidst important political events were 
reported as well.  See Shen Hong & Stella Yifan Xie, That Calm Chinese Stock Market? 
It’s Engineered by the State, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/that-calm-chinese-stock-market-its-engineered-
by-the-government-1527775089 [https://perma.cc/5CFL-LNU3]. 
 100  Amidst Covid-19, companies were recruited to national mask-making 
effort regardless of their ordinary business lines.  See, for example, the recruiting of 
the subsidiaries of Sinopec, an oil and gas giant.  Masha Borak, Chinese Factory Live 
Streams Face Mask Material Production Amid Coronavirus Shortages, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/abacus/news-
bites/article/3074232/chinese-factory-live-streams-face-mask-material-
production-amid [https://perma.cc/XB4Z-N7CH].  There are numerous 
additional instances whereby state-controlled firms were called upon to assist the 
government in a broad array of social tasks, from the Beijing Olympic Games and 
the Shanghai World Expo, to providing assistance following natural disasters.  See 
Jiangyu Wang, The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-owned 
Enterprises, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631, 663 (2014) (“According to a Xinhua report, 
twenty four hours after the Qinghai Yushu earthquake hit on April 14, 2010, China’s 
big SOEs, including the state-owned airlines and airports, energy companies, 
telecoms, transportation firms, medical companies, and agricultural trading 
companies, were called upon by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council 
(Dangzhongyang, Guowuyuan) to participate in the rescue efforts by providing 
services and materials.”). 
 101 See, for example, in the recent Covid-19 context, Finbarr Bermingham & 
Su-Lin Tan, Coronavirus: China ramps up mask production, and reminds world it is 
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Assets Law legally prescribes national and social responsibility 
obligations for any state-invested enterprise, and the PRC Company 
Law does the same for all companies.102  Indeed, a survey of the top 
500 private enterprises (biggest enterprises by annual operating 
income) shows that 94.2 percent of such enterprises participated in 
various national development schemes during 2019.103 
The analysis above should not imply any normative claim 
against state ownership in and of itself, nor against state corporate 
control in China.  It can certainly be the case that state corporate 
control has benefited the Chinese economy, its market development, 
and Chinese society at large.  Rather, the point here is that corporate 
organization in China introduced challenges that are particularly 
alarming for investors in Chinese publicly listed firms (domestic and 
foreign alike). 
The ownership and control structures that characterize many of 
these firms combine the agency costs of dispersed ownership with 
the perils of unmonitored corporate controllers whose interests may 
or may not align with those of public investors in individual firms.  
Firms can be more easily harnessed in pursuit of national and 
political goals, as well as for the personal interests of corporate 
insiders.  Investors in Chinese listed firms seem to be open for 
exploitation on all fronts. 
b. Protections Offered by Conventional Corporate Governance 
According to conventional wisdom, a robust corporate 
governance system should be able to remedy many of the structural 
predicaments reviewed above.  It is, therefore, generally asserted 
that corporate governance should mainly revolve around 
mechanisms that would prevent the exploitation of investors by 
those who control their investment, or, in positive terms, on the 
 
 102  SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, art. 17 (“accept the supervision of the 
general public, assume social responsibilities, and be responsible to the contributor 
[i.e., the state]”); 2005 Company Law, supra note 61, art. 5 (“When conducting 
business operations, a company shall comply with  . . . social morality . . . accept the 
supervision of the government and general public and bear social 
responsibilities.”). 
 103 Ministry Econ. Affs., 2020 Zhongguo Minying Qiye 500 qiang Fabu Baogao 
[2020 中国民营企业 500 强发布报告] (China Top 500 Private Enterprises Released 
Report), ALL-CHINA FED’N INDUS. & COM (Sept. 10, 2020), 
http://www.acfic.org.cn/zzjg_327/nsjg/jjb/jjbgzhdzt/2020my5bq/2020my5bq_
bgbd/202009/t20200904_244200.html [https://perma.cc/QSN9-4J8H]. 
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ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations are assured of 
getting a return on their investment.  If investors’ expectations for a 
fair game are met, the theory goes, they will be reassured and 
encouraged to continue investing.  This will keep the cost of 
financing sufficiently low and will promote a vibrant capital market 
with minimal monitoring costs on part of public investors. 
It follows that potential exploitative behavior by corporate 
control parties (insider management and controlling shareholders) 
can be minimized by an array of monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms gathered under the umbrella of a system’s corporate 
governance regime.  The Anglo-American corporate governance 
system is commonly viewed as the optimal system for the task and 
its mechanisms were embraced into the corporate laws of many 
countries around the world.  
Outwardly, Chinese listed firms appear as many other public 
corporations, embracing conventional corporate governance 
mechanisms, many of which are modeled after Anglo-American 
counterparts.  Boards, independent directors, audit (and 
supervisory) committees, and fiduciary duties infused with 
shareholder standing rights, are featured in China’s Company Law.  
Furthermore, a review of the full legal framework portrays that 
China’s policymakers had opted for an empowering, shareholder-
oriented corporate governance.  Judged solely based on its black-
letter law, contemporary China offers one of the most robust 
shareholder-empowering corporate statutes in the world. 104  
Chinese law thus grants shareholders rights that go far beyond the 
powers conferred on shareholders in many other systems, even 
 
 104 For the shareholders’ assembly extensive list of powers, see 2005 Company 
Law, supra note 61, arts. 37, 98, 99: (1) to determine the company’s operating 
guidelines and investment plans; (2) to elect and replace directors and supervisors 
(except for the representatives of the employees) and to decide their remuneration; 
(3) to approve reports of the board of directors; (4) to approve reports of the 
supervisory board; (5) to approve annual financial budget plans and accounts; (6) 
to approve plans for profit distribution and loss recovery; (7) to decide on changes 
to the registered capital; (8) to approve the issuance of corporate bonds; (9) to adopt 
resolutions on a corporate merger, division, change in the company’s form, 
dissolution or liquidation; (10) to amend the bylaws; and (11) to exercise other 
powers provided for in the bylaws.  Other “important matters” might also require 
a decision by the shareholders (e.g., “to transfer or accept any significant assets”); 
and even a decision on the issuance of new shares which is commonly reserved to 
the board of directors in other corporate regimes.  Id. art. 104, art. 124, art. 150.  A 
fuller account is available in Groswald Ozery, supra note 78, at 45-48. 
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under American corporate laws, the hub of shareholder-primacy 
notions.105 
As I discuss elsewhere, however, this facially shareholder-
empowering regulatory framework does little to empower public 
investors or restrict the behavior of corporate control parties against 
them.  Quite the contrary, the shareholder-empowering approach 
taken in China serves in actuality only to further the Party-state as 
the controlling shareholder.106 
Furthermore, whatever public shareholder rights are on offer, 
other structural impediments—grounded in China’s political 
economy—cast a large shadow of doubt as to the ability of public 
shareholders to secure these rights and have recourse to their losses 
through legal enforcement. 
The infirmities of conventional corporate governance 
institutions in China have been addressed extensively in the 
literature.107  The resulted situation has been described as “a ready 
invitation to opportunism, ‘tunneling,’ minority shareholder 
exploitation and oppression.”108 
A full account of conventional corporate governance 
mechanisms and their operation in China is outside the scope of this 
Article.109   Here, I will briefly review the status of public and private 
enforcement bodies, while presenting the predicaments that 
 
 105 For example, in the United States, under the Model Business Corporation 
Act and Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) all corporate powers are 
vested with the board of directors, whose discretion has been further expanded by 
the courts.  There are only a handful of matters that require shareholders’ approval: 
amendments to the corporate charter (as opposed to bylaws, which can be amended 
by the board of directors), and mergers, consolidation, or a sale of all or 
substantially all assets.   Shareholders may convene a special shareholders’ meeting 
only if the company’s bylaw permits them to do so, and a shareholder proposal is 
generally nonbinding.   See Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. § 101-398.  
See generally Model Bus. Corp. Act (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2002). 
 106 See Groswald Ozery, supra note 78. 
 107 See generally Chao Xi, Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and 
Practice, 17 INT’ L CO. & COM. L. REV. 251, 258-262 (2006) (examining the factors that 
may have deterred Chinese institutional investors from exerting a greater voice in 
corporate governance); Clarke,  supra note 69; Clarke, supra note 67; Howson & 
Clarke, supra note 69; Groswald Ozery, supra note 78; and Donald Clarke, How 
China’s Effort to Bring Private-Sector Standards into the Public Sector Backfired, in 
REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE 
CAPITALISM (Benjamin Liebman & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 2016); Howson, supra note 
87. 
 108 Howson, supra note 87, at 6. 
 109 A full review of external and internal conventional corporate governance 
mechanisms is available in Groswald Ozery, supra note 57, at Chapter 6. 
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rendered legal enforcing institutions in China powerless against 
strong, often Party-state related, corporate insiders, and controllers. 
i. Public Enforcement—The CSRC 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the 
central government agency responsible for protecting the interests 
of investors in China.  Unlike the securities regulator in the United 
States (the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC), the 
CSRC has stepped into aspects of internal governance that are 
traditionally reserved within corporate laws.  The CSRC, for 
example, is responsible for the promulgation of China’s Code for 
Corporate Governance, 110  as well as for a number of mandatory 
regulations that establish investors’ rights beyond what is only 
enabled in the primary Company and Securities Laws (enacted by 
the Chinese legislator, the National People’s Congress).111 
For instance, even before the inclusion of a (loose) independent 
directors provision in the Company Law, the CSRC issued the 
Guidance for Independent Directors, which required listed firms to 
amend their bylaws and appoint independent directors to their 
boards. 112   Around the same time, it enacted rules that were 
designed to make the decision-making process with respect to the 
sale, exchange, or purchase of major assets independent from the 
controlling shareholders of the firm.113  Perhaps most reflective of 
 
 110 Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze [上市公司治理准则] (Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies) (first promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory 




 111 See generally Nicholas Calcina Howson, “Quack Corporate Governance” As 
Traditional Chinese Medicine: The Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China’s 
Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s Battle Against Party State Political Economic 
Power, 37 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 667 (2014) (examining why was the CSRC allowed this 
position). 
 112 Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors 
of Listed Companies, (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n., Aug. 
16, 2001),  
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_691
91.html [https://perma.cc/NH24-KG6L].  
 113  Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Shangshi 
Gongsi Zhongda Goumai, Chushou, Zhihuan Zichan Ruogan Wenti de Tongzhi [
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the CSRC’s investor protection orientation are the CSRC 2004 
Provisions, which encouraged minority shareholders’ participation in 
governance through a public-shareholders’ negative veto on certain 
corporate decisions.114 
Beyond introducing investor protection norms, the CSRC has 
been particularly active in developing market monitoring 
mechanisms that allow it to detect securities market fraud and halt 
off any suspicious trading activity in real-time.  These “penetrative 
supervision” prevention efforts are said to create a “giant network 
of (market) surveillance” facilitated to protect investors.115 
These “regulatory activism” actions by the CSRC are but few 
examples of how China’s capital markets regulator is increasingly 
intent on responding to broad investors’ expectations in order to 
encourage the flow of capital to the market.116 
Still, granting protections and guaranteeing protections are two 
separate things.  While the CSRC was allowed leeway for regulatory 
action, its power to enforce its policies has been curtailed to a large 
degree. 117   Many CSRC rules did not set forth any enforcing 
 
中国证券监督管理委员会关于上市公司重大购买、出售、置换资产若干问题的通知] 
(Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Several Issues 
Concerning Major Purchases, Sales and Exchanges of Assets by Listed Companies) 
(promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n., Oct. 12, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 
2002), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=38021&lib=law 
[https://perma.cc/C5R3-JB6H]. 
 114  See Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhonggu Gudong Quanyi Baohu de 
Ruogan Guiding [关于加强社会公众股股东权益保护的若干规定] (Provisions on 
Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the General Public 
Shareholders) (promulgated by the Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 7, 2004), art. 
1.1.(5), [hereinafter CSRC 2004 Provisions] 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3830&CGid= 
[https://perma.cc/B2XD-JTP6].  See e.g., arts. 1(1)(a)–(d) (referring to approval by 
the “general public shareholders group” (“shehui gongzhonggu gudong”) which is 
understood to mean holders of publicly-listed shares not affiliated with the 
controlling parties). 
 115 Hong and Xie, supra note  99. 
 116 Examples of regulatory activism by the CSRC are numerous.  For details 
on regulatory action by the CSRC, including its 2007 three-year campaign that 
examined the implementation of corporate governance norms in Chinese listed 
firms, see OECD, China Country Study: Self-Assessment Against The OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance (2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/52/46931890.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZJR-
26QF]. 
 117 See Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth, Daniel N. Gao & Oliver M. Rui, Is 
China’s Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? Evidence from Enforcement 
Actions, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 451 (2005). 
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mechanisms and left remedial measures to be set by primary laws.118  
Without administrative sanctions and remedies for violations of 
these rules, CSRC enforcement was largely discretionary.  In that 
endeavor, the CSRC had to navigate the myriad of tensions and 
power conflicts within China’s political economy. 
Public enforcement by the CSRC, particularly against insiders 
and other controlling parties in state-controlled firms, is not 
welcomed by powerful Party-state organs and is often held back.119  
Publicly listed state-controlled enterprises enjoy more lenient 
enforcement of facially uniform legal standards.120  The CSRC, like 
other state agencies, is more likely to enforce laws, regulations, or 
policies (or enforce them more rigorously) against violators that are 
unaffiliated with the Party-state apparatus than against those that 
are affiliated, even in clear cases of oppression or fraud.121 
In sum, while the norms and mandatory provisions of the CSRC 
sometimes result in the empowerment of public shareholders to 
receive fairer treatment, their contribution to investors depends on 
the relative power of the CSRC within the political system at any 
given time. 122   The position of the CSRC within China’s 
administrative and political hierarchy seems to have weakened 
since the 2015–2016 market crash.  Subsequent legal enforcement 
and Party disciplinary procedures against senior CSRC officials 
have discredited the agency and potentially wounded its authority 
 
 118 The 1993 Company Law, which was in force when many of the CSRC rules 
were enacted, only addressed declaratory remedies or cease and desist orders for 
violations of shareholders rights.  See 1993 Company Law, supra note 61,  arts. 111, 
150.  The recent revision of the PRC Securities Law (effective March 2020) expanded 
on the legal liability and remedial measures, supra note 15, Chapter 13. 
 119 But see Huang (Robin) Hui, Enforcement of Chinese Insider Trading Law: An 
Empirical and Comparative Perspective (January 30, 2019), The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2020-24. Forthcoming, Am. J. Comp. 
L. (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325717  [https://perma.cc/XN65-9XAA] 
(finding shift in the CSRC’s enforcement power against insider trading towards 
greater enforcement since 2008). 
 120 Henk Berkman, Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. Fu, Political Connections and 
Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China, 
45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1391, 1393 (2010); William T. Allen & Han Shen, 
Assessing China’s Top-Down Securities Markets (January 2011), Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research., Law and Economics Working Paper No. 16713. 
 121 Berkman, Cole & Lawrence, supra note 120.  For a case example, see the 
CSRC’s enforcement procedures against Nanjing Textile Import Export Corp., Ltd. 
in Groswald Ozery, supra note 78, at 21-22. 
 122 See, e.g., Huang, supra note 119, at 5 (noting that the CSRC’s ability to 
enforce “will depend largely on the local political economy conditions”). 
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within China’s political economy.123  In some respects, the CSRC’s 
void, along with the void of other state institutions, in ensuring 
effective capital market governance, makes way for more direct 
involvement by party institutions.124 
It remains to be seen if the March 2020 amendment of the PRC 
Securities law, which added clarity and force to the administrative 
sanctions and remedies the CSRC is authorized to take, would 
change this political-economy dynamic. 
ii. Private Enforcement—The People’s Courts System 
I have reviewed above the main challenges for administrative 
enforcement by the CSRC in response to securities laws violations 
in Chinese listed firms.  As in other legal systems, the route for 
private enforcement by injured investors (or by the firm) in response 
to corporate malfeasance by managers and other corporate 
controllers passes through the courts’ system.  Despite many 
positive developments, China’s People’s Court system, similar to 
the CSRC, still suffers institutional impediments that curtail its 
ability to enforce effectively and protect the interests of public 
investors against powerful insiders. 
The approach to private securities litigation in China has not 
been particularly welcoming.  As in many other systems around the 
world, an American-style securities law class action was not 
 
 123 The chairman of the CSRC, Xiao Gang, was removed from his position 
following the crises.  See China Removes Xiao as CSRC Head After Stock Market 
Meltdown, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016, 7:47 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/head-of-china-s-
securities-regulator-to-step-down-wsj-reports [https://perma.cc/6ACF-GAQW].  
Additionally, Yao Gang, vice chairman of the CSRC, as well as Zhang Yujun, 
assistant chairman, were investigated through the CCP’s disciplinary proceedings.  
See, e.g., Zhongyang Jiwei Jiancha Bu [中央纪委监察部] (Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection), Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Dangwei 
Weiyuan, Fu Zhuxi Yao Gang Shexian Yanzhong Weiji Jieshou Zuzhi Diaocha [中
国证券监督管理委员会党委委员、副主席姚刚涉嫌严重违纪接受组织调查 ] 
(Investigation of Yao Gang, Member of the Party Committee and Deputy Chairman 
of CSRC, under Suspicion of Serious Disciplinary Violations) (Nov. 13, 2015), 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/jlsc/zggb/jlsc_zggb/201607/t20160704_83027.html 
[https://perma.cc/G59E-FNXL]. 
 124 See generally Groswald Ozery, supra note 76 (referring specifically to Part V 
on the recent shift in the political economic equilibrium within the Party-state 
system).  More generally on the consolidation of control over the state sector during 
Xi Jinping’s rule, see Wendy Leutert, Firm Control: Governing the State-owned 
Economy under Xi Jinping, CHINA PERSP. 2018 1-2, 27 (2018). 
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permitted.125  Instead, a private right of action based on a securities 
law claim can take the form of either an individual action or a joint 
action.126  The latter was available for claims in which the number of 
plaintiffs is fixed at the time of filing or when the court decides to 
adjudicate several individual suits together for particular reasons.127  
The 2020 Securities Law amendment has enacted a provision for a 
“representative action”128 which commentators view as a new path 
for shareholders class-action.129 
Individual actions also do not have a free pass to courts.  In the 
early 2000s, from a complete rejection of private litigation claims 
based on securities law, courts moved to accept some claims, under 
substantive and procedural limitations. 130   Primary among these 
limitations is the narrow scope of underlying claims accepted, which 
is de-facto limited to misrepresentation-based claims,131 as well as a 
 
 125 Hui (Robin) Huang, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten-
Year Retrospective and Empirical Assessment, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 757 (2013). 
 126 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia 
Chenshu Yinfa De Minshi Peichang Anjian de Ruogan Guiding [最高人民法院关于
审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定] (Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court Concerning the Acceptance and Trial of Civil 
Compensation Securities Suits Involving Misrepresentation) (effective Feb. 1, 2003) 
[hereinafter 2003 SPC Circular] (incorporating article 54 of the PRC Civil Procedure 
Law and, by implication, rejecting article 55 of the same law which governs class 
actions). 
 127  For a detailed analysis of the developments of China’s joint action 
mechanism and the differences with a more recognized (U.S.-style) class action, see 
Huang, supra note 125. 
 128 PRC Securities Law, supra note 15, art. 95; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu 
Zhengquan Jiufen Daibiaoren Susong Ruogan Wenti de Guiding [最高人民法院关
于证券纠纷代表人诉讼若干问题的规定] (Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court 
on Several Issues Concerning Representative Actions Arising from Securities 
Disputes), issued by the Supreme People’s Court, July 30, 2020, 
[https://perma.cc/F3J9-JLQZ]. 
 129  China Launches Class-action Lawsuit System for its 167 Million Securities 
Investors, CLYDE & CO., Aug 13, 2020, 
https://www.clydeco.com/en/insights/2020/08/china-launches-class-action-
lawsuit-system-for-its [https://perma.cc/4P3Q-NKYX]; Samuel Shen & Alun John, 
China Govt-backed Class Actions Take Aim at Corporate Fraud – with Limits, REUTERS, 
Aug 18, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-regulation-
classaction/china-govt-backed-class-actions-take-aim-at-corporate-fraud-with-
limits-idUKKCN25F05U?edition-redirect=uk [https://perma.cc/9GK5-N65R]. 
 130 For more information on the relevant Supreme People’s Court circulars 
and background on private securities litigation in China, see Huang, supra note 125, 
at 760-761. 
 131 Although the Securities Law acknowledges the compensation liability of 
an inside trader and of traders who conducted market manipulation (when it 
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requirement that a claim will be heard only following an adverse 
finding in public enforcement procedures (administrative penalty or 
a criminal procedure).132 
A joint opinion by the Supreme People’s Court and CSRC on 
matters related to disputes in securities,133 as well as subsequent 
provincial courts’ opinions, reflects that the People’s Courts system 
is intent on pushing securities claims away from courts into 
 
resulted in losses for investors), it has not yet provided the legal basis for private 
civil litigation based on such claims.  Therefore, investors injured by such actions 
are left to rely on general tort or contract law claims.  See Nicholas Calcina Howson, 
Punishing Possession—China’s All-Embracing Insider Trading Enforcement Regime, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 327, 341-342 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 
2013). 
 132 For a review of additional procedural hurdles embedded in the 2003 SPC 
Circular, see Guiping Lu, Private Enforcement of Securities Fraud Law in China: A 
Critique of the Supreme People’s Court 2003 Provisions Concerning Private Securities 
Litigation, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 781 (2003) (elaborating on procedural provisions 
regarding standing, jurisdiction, and other prerequisites which the author argues 
make private action based on securities law “very hard”). 
 133 Zuigao renmin fayuan zhongguo zhengquan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui 
guanyu quanmian tuijin zhengquan qihuo jiufen duoyuan huajie jizhi jianshe de 
yijian [最高人民法院 中国证券监督管理委员会 关于全面推进证券期货纠纷多元化解
机制建设的意见] (Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the 
Supreme People’s Court on Accelerating the Construction of Diverse Mechanisms 
for Securities and Futures’ Disputes) (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court 
and the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, July 13, 2016), art. 13 [hereinafter SPC & 
CSRC Joint Opinions], 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwdd/201811/t20181130_34750
5.html [https://perma.cc/6H4L-WZFT] (“For civil disputes arising from illegal 
acts such as false statements, insider trading, and manipulation of the market, the 
people’s courts need to declare legal rules through judicial decisions . . . .”). 
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alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 134   A path that was 
subsequently enshrined in a recent revision of the Securities Law.135 
With respect to a private right of action based on governance 
claims established in the PRC Company Law, the 2005 Company 
Law took an important step to protect the rights of shareholders 
with judicial remedies.  These included the enactment of several 
liability provisions and shareholder access to courts:  the 
accountability of shareholders that abused the interests of the 
company or other shareholders, with compensation set as a remedy 
for the company and other shareholders’ losses;136 access to a type 
of appraisal by the court in certain cases where shareholders are 
bought out by the company;137 an option to ask the court to revoke 
certain decisions for legal and procedural violations; 138  standing 
rights against directors and managers for violations that have 
 
 134 SPC & CSRC Joint Opinions, supra note 133.  The Shanghai Financial Court 
was apparently the first to formally develop an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism for securities law disputes, which received the title “Model Judgment 
Mechanism.”  The Beijing Higher People’s Court followed recently with a similar 
model on a trial basis.  Under this mechanism, a securities law dispute (practically 
limited to misrepresentation claims) may be selected as “a model case” for other 
“parallel” cases belonging to the same group securities disputes, to be deliberated 
in principle in mediation, based on the model case’s fact-finding process and legal 
analysis.  The first application for approval of a model case was submitted March 
21, 2019.  See Shanghai Jinrong Fayuan guanyu Zhengquan Jiufen Shifan Panjue 
Jizhi de Guiding [上海金融法院关于证券纠纷示范判决机制的规定] (Regulations of 
the Shanghai Financial Court on the Model Judgment Mechanism for Securities 
Disputes), January 16, 2019 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/lM6Y7VOG9YiOlPEYZHLMhQ 
[https://perma.cc/N3GV-RFHM]; Beijingshi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan guanyu Yifa 
Gongzheng Gaoxiao Chuli Quntixing Zhengquan Jiufen de Yijian (Shixing) [北京市
高级人民法院关于依法公正高效处理群体性证券纠纷的意见（试行）] (Beijing 
Higher People’s Court trial Opinions on the Fair and Efficient Handling of Group 
Securities Disputes According to Law) (for trial implementation) [Jinggao Fafa, 
2019, No. 243], April 30, 2019 
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/P7_NNPhA2HukvpBf60Kogw 
[https://perma.cc/6GWG-6QVK]. 
 135 PRC Securities law, supra note 15, arts. 93, 94. 
 136 2005 Company Law, supra note 61, Arts. 20, 21 (determining similar liability 
and requiring compensation from corporate controllers and insiders who have 
injured the interests of the company by taking advantage of their affiliations). 
 137 Note, however, appraisal through access to court is specified only in the 
case of limited liability companies, while for listed companies the law does not 
specifically mention courts proceedings.  Id.  Compare art. 74, which applies to 
LLCs, with art. 142(4), which applies to listed companies. 
 138 Id. art. 22. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/1
2021] Illiberal Governance and the Rise of China's Public Firms 963 
injured shareholders;139 and finally, the ability to file a derivative 
suit on behalf of the company.140 
Shielding the rights of public shareholders with liability 
provisions and access to courts are of course significant and vital 
steps in any system that aims to protect investors, but it can hardly 
ensure implementation.  The first impediment to overcome in 
applying the remedies formally granted to shareholders is the 
absence of a body that can act on behalf of retail dispersed investors 
as a group.  Institutional investors in China are captured within a 
network of state ownership and control, and other coalition-
building efforts that could potentially overcome a collective action 
problem are restricted.141  The recent revision of the Securities law 
enabled such coalition-building through a government-backed 
“investor protection institution,”142 but it remains to be seen how 
such an institution would operate and will it be allowed to act 
independently. 
Another serious barrier that limits the formally granted access to 
courts are institutional impediments within the judicial system 
itself.  Three main impediments are frequently mentioned in the 
literature:  the professional, even if improving, qualifications of 
judges to adjudicate complex commercial and business law 
matters; 143  the courts’ relative position within the administrative 
hierarchy, general social distrust in the courts’ system, and the 
limited role historically reserved to courts as a legal institution, all 
limiting its autonomy; and finally, the court system’s capture within 
the existing political economy, which leads to its complete lack of 
political independence.144  
 
 139 Id. art. 152. 
 140 Id. art. 149, 151. 
 141 See Groswald Ozery, supra note 78, at 41-44. 
 142 PRC Securities law, supra note 15, arts. 90, 93-95; see also Groswald Ozery, 
supra note 78, at 42-44 (contemplating the prospect of such government-sanctioned 
institution prior to its recognition in the Securities law amendment). 
 143 See Weixia Gu, The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation: Quo 
Vadis Chinese Courts?, 1 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 303 (2013) (providing a comprehensive 
review of the state of affairs of the judiciary in China). 
 144 The Congressional-Executive Commission on China reports “over sixty-
eight percent of surveyed judges identified local protectionism as a major cause of 
unfairness in judicial decisions.”  CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN THE PRC, https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-
prc [https://perma.cc/W78H-9LQ3] (last visited May 25, 2019);  see also Yuhua 
Wang, Court Funding and Judicial Corruption in China, 69 CHINA J. 43 (2013) 
(examining the setting and practice of courts’ funding and their perceived judicial 
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Such impediments are felt particularly when controversial cases 
arise.  These are cases that pose potential threats to the legitimacy of 
the Party-state system or to social stability, based not only on their 
substantive matter but also on the identity of the litigants.  Cases in 
which investors’ claims are against state-controlled companies and 
affiliated defendants, claims potentially pertaining to a large 
number of litigants, or simply those that reflect badly on either the 
Party or the state (central or local governments) are often pushed 
away by the courts.145 
A non-independent court system embedded within the Party-
state bureaucracy cannot work to check and balance the power of 
corporate control parties over public shareholders.  Given that the 
court system is formally and functionally a branch of government 
enmeshed within the broader hierarchical network, it has even a 
greater impartiality challenge when the control parties are at an 
equal or higher position within the Party-state hierarchy—exactly 
the occasions where checks and balances on abuse of power are most 
needed. 
There have been efforts in the past few years to reform the 
People’s Court system.146  The institutional structure was changed 
so as to centralize the management and funding of local courts at the 
level of the provincial governments (rather than by lower-tier local 
authorities) and to create cross-jurisdictional courts.147  Yet, these 
efforts focus on centralizing control over the judicial system, not 
reducing it.  The reforms focus on increasing professionalism and 
curbing local protectionism.  Most of the changes are aimed to curb 
courts’ dependence on immediate local governments. 148   These 
efforts may result in more autonomy in some lower-level cases, but 
 
corruption); Nicholas Calcina Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts, 
1992-2008: Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 E. ASIA L. REV. 
303, 327-329 (2010) (discussing cases from the Shanghai People’s Courts reflecting 
more, and less, autonomy); Gu, supra note 143, at 313. 
 145 See Clarke & Howson, supra note 69, at 247.  But see Hui Huang, Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis, 27 
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 619, 648-653 (2012) (critiquing arguments about political 
barrier and suggesting instead economic rationales as explanations for the limited 
number of derivative lawsuits). 
 146  See China Issues White Paper on Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts, CHINA 
DAILY,  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-
02/27/content_28361584_3.htm [https://perma.cc/FZH7-APVV] (last updated 
Feb. 27, 2017). 
 147 See Carl Minzner, Legal Reform in the Xi Jinping Era, 20 ASIA POL’Y 4, 7 (2015). 
 148 See, e.g., Yueduan Wang, “Detaching” Courts from Local Politics? Assessing 
the Judicial Centralization Reforms in China, 2020 CHINA QUARTERLY 1, 2. 
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nothing in these efforts aims to increase the independence of the 
court system from the Party-state apparatus more generally, nor to 
strengthen the autonomy of the court system as an institution. 
c. Implications for the United States and Other Foreign Investors 
Resulting from the picture above, both public and private 
enforcement mechanisms are therefore unable to guarantee the 
interests of public investors against China’s corporate controlling 
apparatus, be it against the interests of China’s national champion 
listed entities and their insiders and controllers, the local 
governments as shareholders and their appointees, or even 
politically entrenched private actors.  This reality perpetuates a 
situation whereby China’s conventional corporate governance 
system is unable to restrain corporate control parties ex-ante nor to 
hold them accountable ex-post.149 
The relevance of such a reality for foreign investors that are 
invested directly in China’s capital market is clear.  Perhaps less 
straightforward is the impact on foreign investors when they invest 
in Chinese companies that are listed, and even domiciled, outside of 
China—as is indeed the case for most offshore-listed Chinese 
firms.150 
When a Chinese firm issued shares in an offshore market, 
investors in the issuer are exposed to the impediments discussed 
above through their dependence on the operating Chinese entities 
and their insiders.  Any excess opportunities for self-dealing, 
tunneling, and corruption in China (whether by the insiders and 
controlling shareholders of the operating firm or by the officials 
involved in supervising and regulating their activity)151 spill over to 
harming foreign investors outside China.  Likewise, any concern for 
“expropriation” through the state’s interference with the firms’ 
decision making in favor of national (or other) priorities,152 would 
apply to the Chinese operating entity and might therefore impact 
the operations and the economic results of the offshore issuer, 
affecting investors’ interests. 
 
 149 See Groswald Ozery, supra note 78, at 19. 
 150 With respect to China-based U.S. issuers, see Moon, supra note 40.  With 
respect to Chinese firms listed for trade in Hong Kong, supra note 33. 
 151 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 152 See supra Part III.A.2. 
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While the embedded risks apply also to foreign investors in 
China-based offshore issuers, the limited remedies enshrined in 
China’s conventional framework of corporate governance, do not.  
These remedies are subject to limitations of firm domicile and 
jurisdiction. 153   Whichever rights and protections are granted to 
investors in Chinese issuers by application of China’s Company and 
Securities laws, such rights and protections are beyond the reach of 
foreign investors in most offshore listed China-based firms.154 
On top of these market inherent hurdles, foreign investors in 
China-based offshore issuers experience some unique concerns as 
well.  These unique concerns emanate from the organizational 
structures commonly used to facilitate the offshore listings of China-
based firms,155 the inadequacy of legal arrangements that regulate 
the activity of foreign issuers in their host country, 156  as well as 
China’s own policies and conducts with respect to cooperation with 
foreign authorities.  These specific concerns have been brought to 
the fore by U.S. regulators in recent years157 and will be discussed 
further in Part V in the context of recent U.S. policy shifts. 
 
 153 Articles 2 and 10 of the 2005 Company law, supra note 61 (setting the 
applicability of the Company law on companies established in the PRC territory 
with the main registered office as the firm’s domicile); Article 78, supra note 61 
(requiring that at least fifty percent of the founders of a joint stock company are 
domiciled in China); and Article 2 of the PRC Securities law, supra  note 15 (setting 
the applicability of the securities law on issuers and traders in the PRC); Article 2 
of the Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 110 (setting the applicability of the 
code on companies incorporated following the PRC Company law whose stocks are 
listed and traded on PRC stock exchanges). 
 154  Note that the March 2020 amendment to the PRC Securities Law 
potentially expands the applicability of accountability provisions under the law on 
security issuances and trading activity outside China when such activity disrupted 
China’s internal market order and damaged the rights and interests of China’s 
domestic investors (thus expanding protections under the law to Chinese investors 
in firms listed offshore).  Supra note 15, art. 2. 
 155 As risks analysts and Chinese law practitioners often note, the legality of 
the VIE structure that is often used to facilitate offshore listing is questionable.  
Which PRC laws will apply and how will they apply on offshore listed China-based 
firms is, therefore, still an open question.  Supra notes 42-43 (noting the structure 
and unique risks embedded in VIEs);  supra notes 45-46 (noting the structure and 
unique risks in reverse merger firms); as well as the discussion in Part V infra. 
 156 See William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 
1444-49 (2020) (pointing to host jurisdictions that erected procedural hurdles to 
pursue derivative lawsuits). 
 157 See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: 
TOPIC NO.10, (2020), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/disclosure-considerations-
china-based-issuers [https://perma.cc/SLG5-V9UA] (noting a variety of specific 
risks for U.S. investors in China-based issuers). 
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The implications for foreign investors are particularly alarming 
if one considers the limited ability of host countries (United States 
or other) to enforce their own laws and execute judgments over 
China-based offshore listed firms and their insiders.158 
IV. ALTERNATIVES WITHIN ILLIBERAL GOVERNANCE159 
So far, the Article discussed the growing integration of Chinese 
listed firms with global financial markets through their access to 
public finance.  Given the challenges of corporate organization in 
China which created ample opportunities for shareholder abuse, 
and in the absence of robust legal protections for public investors in 
Chinese firms (both in and outside China), what explains the 
puzzling allure of these firms and their ability to attract external 
finance at home and abroad?  What works in the system to balance-
off such risks and explains investors’ confidence? 
This Article finds answers in China’s illiberal corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
Alongside its many obstructions, China’s illiberal governance 
utilizes alternative mechanisms—at both the state and Party 
capacities—to ensure market regularity.  In the corporate 
governance context, specifically, these alternative governance 
mechanisms boost market stability and discipline corporate 
insiders.  Through both carrots and sticks, such an alternative 
framework supports market growth and reassures investors that 
their reasonable expectations for returns will be met.160 
Attributes of illiberal corporate governance are thus responsible 
for many of the ailments surrounding investments in Chinese firms, 
but at the same time hold the key to understanding the market’s 
unprecedented success and its allure to investors. 
 
 158 Fried & Kamar, supra note 44 (arguing that PRC laws insulate the insiders 
of China-based U.S. issuers from legal accountability and remedies based in U.S. 
laws). 
 159 The following discussion does not include all the mechanisms through 
which greater market regularity is promoted by state and/or Party institutions.  
Many more mechanisms are deployed as part of China’s illiberal governance but 
cannot be covered here (e.g., a corporate social credit system, China’s cadre 
evaluation and promotion system and its market impact). 
 160 As Clarke aptly notes, “It is perception, which determines whether persons 
are willing to invest and make deals, that counts . . . .”  Clarke, supra note 60, at 91. 
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a. Carrots of State Capacity 
State ownership is generally considered less efficient even while 
the precise effects of state ownership on the performance of Chinese 
listed firms are ambiguous.161  Notwithstanding, state capacities can 
support the growth of Chinese firms and lure investments in 
additional ways. 
Numerous studies in the political science literature and 
development economics explore China’s economic growth and 
address the role of the state in supporting economic development.  
Some of the arguments expressed in these studies can explain the 
puzzle of external finance in public firms as well.  The aspects of 
state support that received the most scholarly attention are 
“developmental-state” style policies, which include granting certain 
firms preferred access to credit, tax incentives, subsidies, priority in 
infrastructure projects, and other forms of economic assistance from 
the Chinese government (central and local authorities). 
Implicit and explicit state guarantees for the debts of financial 
institutions and large firms are known to have prevented financial 
stress, add stability, and shield certain firms from default risks.162  
Studies show that these forms of state support mainly favored state-
controlled companies and large politically connected private firms 
and discriminated against small-medium enterprises and the 
private sector more generally.163 
 
 161 Some studies suggest that the effect on performance depends on the level 
of state ownership.  Others argue that the effect depends on which administrative 
level of the state holds the shares and how far away is the state in the ownership 
chain.  See, for example, the studies covered in Clarke, supra note 69, at 139-143. 
 162  But see LOGAN WRIGHT, LAUREN GLOUDEMAN & DANIEL H. ROSEN, THE 
CHINA ECONOMIC RISK MATRIX 32-38 (Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Studies, 2020) (opining 
that the state’s capacity to manage financial stress is changing). 
 163  See Franklin Allen, Jun “QJ” Qian & Meijun Qian, A Review of China’s 
Institutions, 11 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 39, 39-64 (2019) (and the sources therein); 
Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China, 
77 J. FIN. ECON. 57, 59 (2005) (noting that other “corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as those based on reputation and relationships . . . support the growth of the 
private sector”); Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 6 (attributing the success of large 
Chinese firms, regardless of ownership, to their ability to foster relationships and 
connections to the government).  See generally YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH 
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE STATE (2008) (comparing 
economic growth in Shanghai, a state-led municipality, and Zhejiang province, 
where entrepreneurship was allowed to thrive, and lamenting the economic effects 
of private sector discrimination). 
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Other forms of state macro-economic controls help in triggering 
initial demands in the capital market164 and artificially affect supply 
and demand thereafter. 165 
These forms of state support, combined with the state’s 
shareholding capacity, help prop up certain firms, give them 
advantages at market entry or exit points, and support their 
expansion (including into global markets). 166   The effect of 
preferential state support on IPO approvals has been specifically 
observed.167  Interestingly, investors were found to value political 
connections in the IPO process.168 
The support of the state can certainly explain how preferred 
firms were shielded from financial distress or economic crises and 
 
 164 For example, the IPO Quota system substituted for market forces during 
early development stages.  See Groswald Ozery, supra note 57, at Chapter 5.  China’s 
IPO fixed pricing system is an additional artificial mechanism to raise demand.  See 
Qian et. al, supra note 16.  QFII quota limit the allotted supply for foreign investors, 
which presumably increased demand. 
 165 Macro-economic measures, such as trade suspensions, are often used to 
control market volatility.  Notably, during the 2015-2016 market turmoil share 
prices were propped up through massive, mandated purchase orders and blanket 
suspensions of trade.  See Almost Half of China’s Firms Halt Trading as Market Dives, 
FRANCE 24 (July 8, 2015, 4:19 PM), http://www.france24.com/en/20150708-
almost-half-chinese-firms-suspend-trading-market-dives [https://perma.cc/C3TJ-
RFZY] (explaining that by July 8, 2015, 1,300 listed firms, representing close to forty-
five percent of the market at that time, were instructed to suspend trading to hold 
back share price decrease.) 
 166 See ASIFMA, CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS: NAVIGATING THE ROAD AHEAD 67 
(2017), https://www.asifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/china-capital-
markets-final-english-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HAR-BJP2]; Qian Peng et 
al., supra note 82, at 322-23 (showing how propping by the state helped financial 
distressed firms).  On forms of support by the Chinese government in economic 
development more generally, see, for example, Yingyi Qian, How Reform Worked in 
China, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
297, 305-306 (Dani Rodrik ed., 2003); Thomas G. Rawski, Will Investment Behavior 
Constrain China’s Growth?, 13 CHINA ECON. REV. 361, 370 (2002). 
 167 See, e.g., Joseph P. H. Fan, T.J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, Politically Connected 
CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China’s Newly Partially 
Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 330, 331-32 (2007) (treating political connections 
as a proxy for government interference in firms and examining the effect on post-
IPO market performance); Joseph D. Piotroski & Tianyu Zhang, Politicians and the 
IPO Decision: The Impact of Impending Political Promotions on IPO Activity in China, 
111 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 120-25 (2014) (examining the effect of provincial-level 
political promotions on the pace and scope of IPO activity in China); Qigui Liu, 
Jinghua Tang & Gary Gang Tian, Does Political Capital Create Value in the IPO Market? 
Evidence from China, 23 J. CORP. FIN. 395, 409 (2013) (finding a positive relation 
between politically connected executives and the probability of IPO approval). 
 168 See Liu et. al, supra note 167, at 409-10 (finding that investors value political 
connections, attaching a market premium to connected firms) 
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how certain firms and sectors were pushed forward.  Consequently, 
if investors rely on such carrots of state capacity and have developed 
an expectation that the Chinese government will have a hand in 
promoting its firms and will effectively respond to prevent crises, 
such expectations affect investors’ perception of risk. 
While state support is not always guaranteed and investors 
might not be able to identify the firms enjoying a preferential 
treatment at all times, 169  a strong expectation that the Chinese 
government will take effective stabilizing steps and will continue 
supporting growth, at the market level, ensures that they remain 
confident. 
This is particularly relevant for foreign investors.  As mentioned, 
most foreign investors are invested in Chinese firms through 
institutional investment vehicles and funds that track indices in 
which Chinese firms are included.  The broad exposure of these 
investment vehicles to the Chinese market makes what happens in 
an individual firm less significant than China’s market-level trends.  
Some risks in capital investing in Chinese firms are thus balanced by 
the state’s economic capacities in the market. 
Notwithstanding, investors’ confidence cannot be based solely 
on the general assumption that the state would rescue sluggish firms 
and would support market growth through various interventions.170  
If the gains from state support will be tunneled out from investors’ 
pockets to the pockets of corporate insiders in self-dealing 
transactions, or if the state would freely and frequently channel 
publicly-listed firms to carry its social bidding, external finance—
particularly from foreigners—will dissipate. 
 
 169 Investing alongside the state can mitigate such information asymmetry.  
See Charles Calomiris et al., Profiting from Government Stakes in a Command Economy: 
Evidence from Chinese Asset Sales, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 399 (2010) (documenting negative 
market responses to unexpected announcements on sales of government shares in 
listed SOEs and conversely a positive effect following relevant policy cancellation, 
arguing that the benefits of political ties outweigh efficiency costs of state-
shareholdings). 
 170  Particularly as the Party-state seems more and more intent on finally 
reducing financial institutions’ reliance on the state.  See Han Wei, Baoshang Bank 
Cleared to Start Bankruptcy Proceedings, CAIXIN (Nov. 24, 2020, 6:10 AM), 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-11-24/baoshang-bank-cleared-to-start-
bankruptcy-proceedings-101631595.html [https://perma.cc/DMJ6-K7T6] (noting 
that the Chinese government recently allowed, for the first time, default in a major 
commercial bank).  Financial institutions were seen, so far, as too important (or too 
connected) to be allowed to fail.  Allowing such firms to fail better aligns with 
market fundamentals yet pose new risks on corporate debt which might affect 
investors’ confidence.  See WRIGHT ET. AL, supra note 162,  at 6-9. 
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Importantly, state capacity is only one foreground of illiberal 
corporate governance in China that fosters investors’ confidence.  
The other foreground, to which I move next, is the role of the 
Chinese Communist Party in advancing market regularity. 
b. Sticks of Party Presence171 
Over the past decade, the Chinese Communist Party has become 
uniquely invested in, and thus committed to, China’s economic 
growth narrative.172  One resulted aspect of this is the Party’s strong 
intent on directing economic results and advancing market 
regularity by intensifying its ability to actively control the behavior 
of market participants. 
To facilitate this, the Party intensified its ability to directly 
influence the governance of firms, separately from state ownership.  
Especially since the General Secretary of the CCP and China’s 
President, Xi Jinping, rose to power (2012/2013, respectively), China 
opted for a complete deviation from orthodox views on how 
corporations should be managed by politicizing its corporate 
governance system to degrees unseen since the planned economy 
era.173 
Part of this change is motivated by the acute need to curb down 
corruption and economic malfeasance.  Corruption has become an 
 
 171 This section draws from Groswald Ozery, supra note 76. 
 172 See, e.g., Zachary Keck, Chinese Elites: The Real Threat to the Communist Party, 
DIPLOMAT (Jan 28, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinese-elites-the-
real-threat-to-the-communist-party/ [https://perma.cc/3NYQ-8WLY] 
(emphasizing the challenge of rebalancing the economy while maintaining benefits 
for the political elite); David Shambaugh, The Coming Chinese Crackup, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 6, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-
crack-up-1425659198 [https://perma.cc/N669-W3K6] (pointing to China’s 
economic “systemic traps” and Xi’s reform efforts as an indicator to regime 
vulnerability and instability); Joshua Ball, An Economic Downturn in China is the 
Greatest Threat to Chinese Domestic Security, GLOB. SEC. REV. (May 28, 2018) 
https://globalsecurityreview.com/degree-chinas-internal-stability-depend-
economic-growth/ [https://perma.cc/VVL8-ELVE] (arguing that an economic 
downturn in China is the greatest threat to Chinese domestic security); Joshua Ball, 
The Chinese Communist Party’s Biggest Fears Are Separatism And An Economic Crisis, 
GLOBAL SECURITY REV. (Apr 10, 2020) https://globalsecurityreview.com/threats-
legitimacy-power-chinese-communist-party/ [https://perma.cc/PDM3-TQDT] 
(depicting “sustained economic growth” as a new mandate of heaven). 
 173 Groswald Ozery, supra note 76, at 5-6. 
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imminent threat to the regime’s stability, 174  Party unity, and 
legitimacy.175  China’s crony capitalism, i.e., the overlap between its 
business and political elites, 176  amplifies opportunities for 
corruption and increases the volume of cases in which corrupt 
conduct is exercised through, or simply involves, corporations. 
The opportunity for illicit exchange between state/Party 
officials and private actors is particularly abundant through 
corporatized SOEs.  Corporate-related corruption, particularly cases 
involving corporatized SOEs, has surged in recent years and poses 
a special threat to the Party-state.177  Bearing these complexities in 
mind, the Party’s incentives to promote growth while directly 
coming down on surging corporate corruption and related 
wrongdoing becomes clear.  
These circumstances suggest some degree of an alignment of 
interests between the Party and corporate stakeholders, even public 
investors. 178  Perhaps inadvertently, the CCP has become one of the 
 
 174  China Must Root out Corruption or Communist Party Will Be Erased from 




 175 See, for example, President Xi Jinping’s expositions stating that corruption 
if not treated “will inevitably lead to the downfall of the party and the state” 
(wangdang wangguo).  China’s Xi Amassing Most Power since Deng Raises Reform Risk, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 30, 2013, 10:07 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-30/china-s-xi-amassing-
most-power-since-deng-raises-risk-for-reform [https://perma.cc/2NJH-TL6S]. 
 176  On the relationship between China’s private sector elite members and 
Party-state officials and resulted corruption, see Keira Lu Huang, China’s Graft-




 177 On the connection between corporatized SOEs and the CCP’s fight against 
corruption see Groswald Ozery, supra note 76, at 37-45.  On the surge of corporate 
related corruption, see id. at n.141. 
 178  For example, following popular criticism against dubious investment 
activity by privately held Chinese companies abroad, Xi Jinping declared financial 
stability to be a matter of national security.  While this can be cynically viewed as 
an excuse to simply exert control over private actors, this step seems motivated, at 
least partially, by a genuine concern for financial stability—thus internalizing the 
need to protect public investors in highly leveraged firms that operate dubious 
investments abroad and responding to mass protests against them.  Minxin Pei, Xi 
Jinping’s War on Financial Crocodiles Gathers Pace, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/19810ea2-5814-11e7-80b6-9bfa4c1f83d2 
[https://perma.cc/E4M7-E2VN] (emphasizing political motivations but noting 
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primary organs within China’s economic-power apparatus to 
provide assurances to investors.  It does so by deploying its own 
functional substitutes for conventional corporate monitoring and 
accountability, and by repeatedly signaling its commitment to 
market growth.179  
I have detailed elsewhere the various components and functions 
of China’s recent formal shift to a “politicized corporate 
governance.”180   There, I described how political mechanisms of 
corporate governance functionally substitute for both market 
incentives and conventional legal monitoring and accountability 
institutions and discussed implications for convergence and path 
dependence theories.  Here, I would like to focus particularly on 
how the CCP’s corporate governance capacity, as it developed over 
the past decade, increases market regularity, and thus contributes to 
investors’ confidence. 
The CCP’s capacity in firms no doubt has costs.  At the same 
time, it also increases monitoring, discipline, and accountability, and 
in these ways (perhaps inadvertently) balances off some of the 
investment risks discussed above.  In a way, greater CCP 
involvement in corporate governance is filling a void left by a 
largely dis-functional legal system and other captured state 
institutions.181 
The strains that greater political involvement in firms may place 
on managerial discretion, risk-taking, and possibly on firm 
performance are to be expected, but the positive effects on firms and 
 
market ones as well).  Relatedly, see Lucy Hornby, Chinese Crackdown on Dealmakers 
Reflects Xi Power Play, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/ed900da6-769b-11e7-90c0-90a9d1bc9691 
[https://perma.cc/UGY6-7FEW]: 
The regulators’ argument that shadow banking posed a national risk 
found an unlikely ally in China’s security apparatus.  Ordinary people 
who had lost money in high-interest products have taken to the streets in 
every province over the past few years.  Nothing captured the interest of 
the Communist party like a mass protest. 
 179 See, e.g., Xi JinPing, Zai Minying Qiye Zuotanhui Shang De Jianghua [习近平
：在民 营企业座谈 会上的讲话 ] (Xi Jinping: Speech at the Symposium of Private 
Enterprises) PEOPLE’S DAILY, (Nov. 1, 2018), 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1102/c64094-30377329.html 
[https://perma.cc/T6ZN-RRLP]. 
 180 Groswald Ozery, supra note 76, at 6. 
 181 Of course, and as reviewed above, China’s political economy is also the 
source of the institutional weaknesses in the legal system and of state capture to 
begin with. 
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their investors should be recognized as well and are rarely 
discussed. 
i. Anti-Corruption and Corporate Wrongdoing 
A recent institutional reform centralized all anti-corruption 
work in China under a National Supervisory Commission.182  As 
part of the reorganization, the Communist Party’s Central 
Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI)—a political 
institution and the Party’s primary investigative and disciplinary 
body—was institutionalized, legalized, and placed under the new 
state agency. 
Following the reform, the CCDI is now assigned to all 
investigatory powers, including concerning violations by non-party-
member state functionaries.  The new agency is, therefore, a Party-led 
state organ, 183  with an all-encompassing authority to not only 
supervise and investigate but also to sanction misconduct of both 
Party and state agents.184  
At least formally, corruption cases involving criminal offenses 
(such as bribery, embezzlement, and seeking improper gains) must 
be transferred to traditional legal institutions (the People’s 
Procuratorate and the People’s Courts) to be prosecuted according 
to the criminal law but following a CCDI investigation and in addition 
to any disciplinary sanction the CCDI applies.185 
 
 182 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiancha Fa [中华人民共和国监察法] (The 
Supervision Law of the People’s Republic of China) (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 20, 2018) [hereinafter PRC Supervision Law], art. 
11(2), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-03/21/content_2052362.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZS95-SVLM] (listing corruption among the “duty-related 
violations” that a Supervisory Commission is entrusted to investigate and enforce 
against, together with “bribery, abuse of power, neglect of duty, power rent-
seeking, tunneling, practice of favoritism and falsification, as well as the waste of 
state assets”). 
 183 Chris Buckley, In China, Fears That New Anticorruption Agency Will Be Above 
the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-
anticorruption.html [https://perma.cc/2BZA-GZCX]; Jeremy Daum, Unsupervised 
—Initial Thoughts on the Supervisory Law, CHINA L. TRANSLATE (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/unsupervised/ 
[https://perma.cc/973G-MQU6]. 
 184 PRC Supervision Law, supra note 182, arts. 15-18, 41, 43. 
 185  Before the recent institutional reform, there was a similar reliance in 
corruption cases involving criminal offense.  For data from before the structural 
reform, see Samson Yuen, Disciplining the Party, 3 CHINA PERSP. 41,43-45 (2014). 
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The reform in anti-corruption work also has direct implications 
for corporations.  It expands the scope of Party anti-corruption and 
disciplinary authority and methods over additional millions of 
public sector organizations and individuals, many of whom are not 
party members. 186   Corporatized SOEs and their state-appointed 
managers and other functionaries are now formally included as 
well. 187  This change also potentially subjects all employees of SOEs 
that could be viewed as civil servants, or as performing public roles, 
to political disciplinary enforcement.188 
Furthermore, the term “SOE” is interpreted broadly and may 
include firms with minority state holdings, thus further broadening 
the scope of ostensibly private entities and individuals under CCP 
disciplinary supervision as well.189  
The Party’s political-disciplinary inspection and enforcement 
efforts have thus been intensified not only toward social control in 
general but also specifically with respect to firms and their 
 
 186 Jun Mai, How China’s New Anti-Graft Super Body Will Work, and Why Calling 




 187 PRC Supervision Law, supra note 182, art. 15. 
 188 Id. at art. 15 (3) & (6). 
 189 While the Supervision Law itself does not define the term SOEs, this broad 
interpretation is reflected in other relevant regulatory documents such as the SOE 
Reform Guiding Opinions, infra note 200 (noting that in commercial SOEs the state 
“may be the absolute or relative controlling shareholder, or be merely a 
shareholder”).  Moreover, the SOE Assets Law refers to state invested enterprises.  
See SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, art. 2 (“‘state-owned assets’ as mentioned in this 
Law refers to the rights and interests formed by the various forms of investment of 
the state in enterprises”); SOE Assets Law, supra note 71, art. 5 (“The term ‘state-
invested enterprise’ as mentioned in this Law refers to a wholly state-owned 
enterprise or company with the state being the sole investor, or a company in which 
the state has a stake, whether controlling or non-controlling.”).  SOEs in many other 
occasions are viewed by Chinese authorities in the broader sense to include 
enterprises with state capital.  See, e.g., Criminal Code, Guojia Tongji Ju Guanyu Dui 
Guoyou Gongsi Qiye Rending Yijian de Han, Guo Tong Han [2003] 44 Hao [国家统计局
关于对国有公司企业认定意见的函国统函 [2003]44 号] (Letter by National Bureau of 
Statistics about Opinions on the Recognition of State Owned Companies [2003] No. 4), 
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insiders.190  As the number of corruption investigations related to 
corporatized SOEs has risen,191 SOEs and their insiders seem to have 
been “targeted.”192 
1. Enhanced Corporate Monitoring 
Enforcement against corporate-related corruption contributes to 
market regularity.  Notably, however, the most interesting 
contribution anti-corruption work has to offer to corporate 
governance is made through enhanced intra-firm monitoring.  
Targeting corporate corruption is made easier through a 
collaborative effort with an intra-firm Party organization that 
facilitates monitoring over corporate insiders.  
Indeed, the Party has a ready tool at the firm level to monitor 
corporate insiders and to hold them accountable for corporate 
corruption and related misconducts.  This access is nestled in the 
Party’s intra-firm presence—the corporate “Party Committee” (also 
known as “Party organization”) whose corporate governance 
authorities have recently been formalized and broadened. 
The Constitution of the CCP,193 as well as the PRC Company 
Law, prescribe a role for a Party Committee in any company 
 
 190  See Yuen, supra note 185, at 41-42 (pointing out how Xi’s campaign is 
different from previous anti-corruption campaigns in that respect). 
 191  Angela Meng, A Quarter of Chinese SOEs Executives Investigated for 
Corruption Work in Energy Sector, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1778702/quarter-
chinese-soe-executives-investigated-corruption [https://perma.cc/C57Z-EAVZ] 
(noting that between November 2012 and April 2013 alone, CCDI investigated 124 
SOE executives, a quarter of which lead companies in the state-run energy sector, 
while another thirteen percent worked in infrastructure and twelve percent headed 
companies in telecommunications). 
 192 Id.  See also Frank Fang, Anti-Corruption Campaign Targets China’s State-
Owned Enterprises, EPOCH TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://www.theepochtimes.com/anti-corruption-campaign-targets-chinas-state-
owned-enterprises_1256832.html [https://perma.cc/9UTF-UZN6] (reporting that 
the CCDI had marked twenty-six central SOEs as targets for its next round of 
investigations); Lucy Hornby, China’s Anti-Corruption Drive Targets Sinopec: Oil 
Group Among Several State-Owned Enterprises to Face Probe, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), 
https://www.ft.com/content/f0cc6d0a-7b82-11e4-a695-00144feabdc0 
[https://perma.cc/5CB9-C59F]. 
 193  ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG ZHANGCHENG [ 中国共 产党章程 ] (THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA) (as amended and promulgated 
by the Nat’l Cong. of the Communist Party of China, Oct. 24, 2017).  The CCP 
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established and registered in the territory of China with at least three 
party members,194 regardless of the firm’s shareholder ownership-
base, place of actual operation, or share issuance.  This intra-firm 
presence practically means that the CCP has an assigned and 
distinct corporate capacity within many Chinese firms, whether 
these are private or state-controlled firms, foreign-invested or not. 
This political presence in firms is not new,195 but historically, a 
Party Committee was not deployed systematically outside several 
meaningful state-controlled firms.  Furthermore, the relationship 
between this political body and the formal corporate governance 
structure was opaque.196   Both aspects are now changing. 
First, concerning publicly listed firms specifically, a requirement 
to set up a Party organization was further established in the 2018 
amendment to the Code of Corporate Governance of listed firms.197  
Recent data shows that the number of firms with a Party 
organization with corporate governance capacities reflected in their 
 
Constitution, as opposed to the Company law, does not limit the relevant provision 
to “companies” and in fact extends to all forms of enterprises.  See id., art. 30 (“a 
primary Party Organization will be formed in every enterprise . . . where there are 
at least three full members of the Party”).  Note: the Constitution of the Chinese 
Communist Party (also known as the “CCP Charter”) is distinct from the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and formally applies on the Party 
organization and its members only. 
 194 2005 Company Law, supra note 61, art. 19 (“The Chinese Communist Party 
may, according to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, establish its 
organizations in companies to carry out activities of the Chinese Communist Party.  
The company shall provide necessary conditions to facilitate the activities of the 
Party.”). 
 195  The role of a Party organization in firms has long preceded the 2005 
Company Law.  The 1993 Company law similarly stated: “[t]he grass roots 
organizations of the Communist Party of China in a company shall carry out their 
activities according to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China.”  1993 
Company Law, supra note 61, art. 17. 
 196  The Company law itself does not specify the particular roles of the 
corporate Party Committee. 
 197 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 110, art. 5. 
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charter, state-controlled as well as private and including firms that 
are listed in foreign markets,198  has significantly risen.199 
Second, three meaningful developments recently added clarity 
to the corporate governance functions of a Party Committee within 
firms while specifically addressing monitoring functions: 
1) Chapter Five of the Constitution of the CCP clarifies some of 
the monitoring and governance roles of such political institution 
within firms; 
2) A joint CCP Central Committee and State Council 
document—“SOE Reform Guiding Opinions”—emphasizes the 
obligation to formally establish a Party Committee in SOEs and 
describes its corporate governance roles in detail;200 
 
 198 A Hong Kong–based media website reported on 123 Hong Kong-listed 
Chinese firms that amended their articles of incorporation between 2017 and 2018 
to implement such requirement or formalize existing Party Committees.   Sun Leqi, 
Yu 120 Zhongzigu Sheli Dangwei Quanli Kong Lingjia Dongshihui [More Than 120 
Chinese Stocks set up Party Committees for fear of Overriding the Board of Directors], 
APPLE DAILY (Sept. 26, 2018), 
https://hk.finance.appledaily.com/finance/realtime/article/20180926/58722466 
[https://perma.cc/E2VQ-MVGQ].  See also Shirley Yam, Regulators’ Silence on 
Communist Party Presence in Listed State Companies is Deafening, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST (July 22, 2016, 5:07 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1993277/regulators-silence-communist-
party-presence-listed-state-companies [https://perma.cc/RFB2-NL63]. 
 199 See generally Lauren Yu-Hsin Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Party Building or 
Noisy Signaling? The Contours of Political Conformity in Chinese Corporate Governance, 
EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST. (Working Paper No. 493/2020, 2021), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3510342 [https://perma.cc/2L5M-5UYJ] (empirically 
analyzing the adoption of “party-building” provisions in PRC listed firms, state-
controlled as well as private); John Zhuang Liu & Angela Huyue Zhang, Ownership 
and Political Control: Evidence from Charter Amendments, 60 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1 
(2019) (observing differences in the responsiveness time and in the amendment’s 
language between SOEs with higher state ownership, finding quicker and more 
extensive amendment, to those with lower state ownership, finding slower and 
vague amendments); Groswald Ozery, supra note 76,  at 30-31 (noting cases of early 
adopters). 
 200  Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu Shenhua Guoyou Qiye 
Gaige de Zhidao Yijian [中共中央、国务院关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见] 
(Guiding Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and 
the State Council on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises) (Aug. 24, 
2015) [hereinafter “SOE Reform Guiding Opinions,” or “Guiding Opinions”], 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/ 
content_2930440.htm [https://perma.cc/22R4-AWWY].  Section 1 article (3) states: 
“the Party organizations of SOEs shall enjoy a more solid statutory position in 
corporate governance, and fully display their core political role . . . .”  For a list of 
subsequent guidance and regulations, see Guoke Jun Hu Dongyang, Guoqi Dangjian 
Gongzuo Jin Zhangcheng Lujing Ji Jizhi Fenxi  [国企党建工作进章程——路径及机制分
析 ] (Regulations for Party Building Work in State-owned Enterprises: Path and 
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3) A parallel (albeit less formal) national-level policy strives to 
establish an intra-firm Party organization in private sector 
companies. 
Chapter Five in the CCP Constitution reflects the corporate Party 
Committee as a firm-internal political body that is assigned to 
facilitate the Party’s monitoring and disciplinary functions and 
other Party goals internally within firms, as well as to verify 
compliance with state laws. 201   Art. 32(7) states that the Party 
committee is assigned to make sure that 
Party and non-Party cadres strictly observe the law and 
administrative discipline and the financial and economic 
statutes and regulations on personnel of the state and that 
none of them infringe on the interests of the state, the 
collective or the masses”.  Art. 32(8), “to encourage Party 
members and the people to consciously resist unacceptable 
practices and resolutely fight against all violations of Party 
discipline or state law”.  Art 33, “Primary-level Party 
organizations in non-public sector entities shall implement 
the Party’s principles and policies, guide and oversee their 
enterprises’ observance of state laws and regulations . . . . 
Similarly, the SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, an obligatory 
document for all SOEs, provide more clarity on the particular 
corporate governance roles of a Party Committee within SOEs.  
Important in this context, SOEs are enterprises with state assets, 
including wholly state-owned firms and state-controlled firms, and 
also firms in which the state is a minority shareholder.  Indeed, the 
Guiding Opinions make clear that establishing a Party organization 
and carrying out Party work is a prerequisite to pushing forward 
mixed ownership in SOEs,202 meaning enterprises with both private 
 
Mechanism Analysis), ZHONG LUN VIEW (Aug. 1, 2017), 
http://www.zhonglun.com/Content/2017/08-01/1843041618.html 
[https://perma.cc/WHD2-VCYK]. 
 201 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, as amended, supra 
note 193Error! Bookmark not defined., Ch. 5, Arts. 32(7), (8), (33).  For a comparison 
between the 2017 amendment and the former 2012 version, see Yitu Dudong: 
<Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng> Xiugai Duibi Yi Lanbiao [一图读懂: 《中国共
产党章程》修改对比一览表 ] (One Picture to Understand: Comparison List of 
Amendments to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China), S. WEEKLY NEWS 
(Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.infzm.com/content/130258 [https://perma.cc/J5P8-
FVZW]. 
 202  SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 200Error! Bookmark not 
defined., art. 7(24). 
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and state investments.  It should be noted that the identity of the 
private investor in these mixed-ownership firms does not have to be 
Chinese, and thus these recently enacted provisions apply also to 
foreign-invested joint ventures and publicly-listed firms—including 
those listed on foreign stock exchanges—in which the Chinese state 
has even a minority stake.203 
In these firms, the corporate governance roles of the Party 
Committee explicated by the Guiding Opinions extend far beyond 
the ideological education and social responsibility tasks that are 
perhaps to be expected from a body of this nature.  As I elaborate 
elsewhere, they encompass a direct and now explicit role in 
corporate decision making as well.204 
Concerning monitoring, specifically, the Party organization is 
established to function as the leading organ within the firm assigned 
to party line education, disciplinary inspection work, forming an 
intra-firm accountability system, investigating the conduct of 
enterprise leaders, strengthening inspections in SOEs, and easing 
the work of anti-corruption institutions (i.e., CCDI).205  In the context 
 
 203 Cf. Simon Denyer, Command and control: China’s Communist Party Extends 




[https://perma.cc/GUM2-ZX83] (noting that some “American and European 
companies involved in joint ventures with state-owned Chinese firms have been 
asked . . . to give internal Communist Party cells an explicit role in decision-
making”). 
 204 The level of de-facto political intervention in the decision-making process 
of a particular firm varies and is affected by different firm characteristics.  See 
Groswald Ozery, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, Hearing on “U.S. Investment in China’s Capital Markets and Military-
Industrial Complex,” March 19, 2021, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/us-
investment-chinas-capital-markets-and-military-industrial-complex [USCC 
Testimony]; cf. Yu-Hsin Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 199Error! Bookmark not 
defined. (measuring the effect of state ownership, cross listing, and political 
connections on the rate of adoption of different party building provisions through 
charter amendments and finding wide variations in the content of the provisions 
adopted with respect to involvement in decision making). 
 205 Note, however, that the CCDI is not mentioned formally.  See SOE Reform 
Guiding Opinions, supra note 200Error! Bookmark not defined., art. 1(3), generally, 
as well as art. 7(26) (“The Party organizations of SOEs shall earnestly perform their 
duties as the primary players responsible, while their disciplinary inspection 
agencies shall effectively perform supervisory responsibilities.”).  The Guiding 
Opinions also include an instruction to  
keep using the thinking and methods of the rule of law to fight corruption, 
fine-tune anti-corruption institutions and systems, strictly enforce the 
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of corporate corruption, therefore, the Party Committee functions as 
a type of a whistleblower for the Party. 
Interestingly, corporatized SOEs are now required to 
incorporate the Party Committee and explicate its powers in their 
governing documents. 206   In publicly listed firms, such change 
requires shareholders’ approval and public disclosure under the 
PRC Company and Securities Laws.207  Through this requirement, 
the operation of a Party Committee inside firms is disclosed to 
foreign and domestic investors and the market at large.  So far, the 
data on such adoptions suggests that public firms and their 
investors are not particularly alarmed by this aspect in the 
politicization of corporate governance in China.208  The acquiesce of 
major U.S. assets management firms to these requirements is also 
suggestive of their support or at least indifference.209 
The requirements (or expectations) from entirely privately held 
firms, particularly foreign-invested and including privately owned 
listed firms, are less clear.  There is certainly a noticeable push210 by 
the CCP to exercise its legal authority to establish a Party Committee 
and conformity in an increasingly growing number of private 
firms. 211   This push dovetails the tightening of control over the 
 
provisions against formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance, 
and strive to build effective mechanisms where enterprise leaders dare not 
to, are not able to, and do not want to, engage in corrupt practices. 
 206 SOE Reform Guiding Opinions, supra note 200, art. 7(24).  See also Code of 
Corporate Governance, supra note 110, art. 5. 
 207 The 2005 Company Law, supra note 61, art. 37, sets revisions in the bylaws 
under the authority of the shareholders’ meeting. 
 208 See discussion supra notes 198-199, 203-204. 
 209 See, e.g., Jennifer Hughes, BlackRock and Fidelity put China’s Communists into 
Company laws, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017),  https://www.ft.com/content/e91270a8-
9364-11e7-bdfa-eda243196c2c [https://perma.cc/7HZY-75Z4]; Lingling Wei, Bob 
Davis & Dawn Lim, China has one Powerful Friend left in the U.S.: Wall Street, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2020, 10:54 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-has-one-
powerful-friend-left-in-the-u-s-wall-street-11606924454 [https://perma.cc/9CK8-
XAJV] (quoting BlackRock: “[t]he party committees already had a role in 
governance . . . [the recent changes] made that [role] more clear and transparent.”). 
 210 See, e.g., Where’s the Party? How the Communist Party is Trying to Expand its 
Influence in the Private Sector, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2012, at 43; Louise Lucas, China 
government assigns officials to companies including Alibaba, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/055a1864-ddd3-11e9-b112-9624ec9edc59 
[https://perma.cc/X3AE-NFHJ]; see also Denyer, supra note 203. 
 211 With respect to publicly listed private firms, see Yu-Hsin Lin & Milhaupt, 
supra note 199 (finding almost six percent of privately owned enterprises listed in 
China—143 firms—voluntarily amended their charters to include the Party’s role 
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private sector more generally, which has been emphasized in both 
rhetoric and Party-state policies in recent years.212 
 
in the firm in response to the SOE reform program, even though they were not 
subject to the policy).  With respect to the private sector more generally, the Chinese 
Private Enterprise Survey (a long-running survey commissioned by organs of the 
Party-state) reports the rising number of private firms with Party organizations 
(48.3 percent in 2018).  See Neil Thomas, Party Committees in the Private Sector: Rising 
Presence, Moderate Prevalence, MACRO POLO (Dec. 16, 2020), 
https://macropolo.org/party-committees-private-sector-china/?rp=e 
[https://perma.cc/6S94-6HP7].  With respect to foreign-invested private firms 
specifically, various reports show a relative low presence of Party organizations.  
For example, only twelve percent of foreign-invested enterprises were reported to 
have Party organizations in Hangzhou.  Id.  In Shanghai, among Shanghai 
AmCham member organizations (out of a total 434 survey respondent companies), 
nineteen percent of foreign-invested enterprises confirmed the presence of a Party 
organization.  See AM. CHAMBER OF COM. IN SHANGHAI, 2018 CHINA BUSINESS REPORT 
19, https://www.amcham-shanghai.org/sites/default/files/2018-
07/China_Business_Report_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8AV-BDNS]. 
 212 Notably, three examples best illustrate this point.  (1) Cent. Comm. of the 
CCP & the State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu Yingzao Qiyejia 
Jiankang Chengzhang Huanjing Hongyang Youxiu Qiyejia Jingshen Geng Hao Fahui 
Qiyejia Zuoyong de Yijian [中共中央、国务院关于营造企业家健康成长环境弘扬优秀
企业家精神更好发挥企业家作用的意见] (Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and 
the State Council on Creating a Sound Entrepreneur Growth Environment, Advocating 
Excellent Entrepreneurship and Better Using Entrepreneurs’ Role) (Sept. 8, 2017), 
[hereinafter “Opinions on Entrepreneurs”] http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-
09/25/content_5227473.htm [https://perma.cc/X58S-4BUF].  As an example, art. 
28 reads: 
Entrepreneurs in the private sector shall be taught and guided in 
upholding party leadership and supporting party building in enterprises.  
A non-public owned enterprise party building work mechanism shall be 
established and improved, various means of party building shall be 
vigorously explored, and the party organization and work coverage in 
non-public owned enterprises shall be expanded with efforts.  The role of 
party organizations as political cores among employees and the people 
and in politically guiding enterprise development shall be fully used. 
Id., art. 2.  (2) Cent. Comm. of the CCP & the State Council, Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Guowuyuan Guanyu Yingzao Geng Hao Fazhan Huanjing Zhichi Minying Qiye Gaige 
Fazhan de Yijian [中共中央、国务院关于营造更好发展环境支持民营企业改革发展的
意见] (Opinions of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on Creating a Better 
Development Environment and Supporting the Reform and Development of Private 
Enterprises) (Dec. 4, 2019), [hereinafter “Opinions on Private Enterprises”] 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-12/22/content_5463137.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4DZS-FTRE].  For example, article 22 highlights ways to 
enhance the co-optation of entrepreneurs into the Party; article 26, in turn, 
emphasizes Party-building work within private firms, such that “ . . . private 
enterprises shall be guided in establishing Party organizations, actively exploring 
and innovating the means of Party building work . . . .”  Id., arts. 22, 26.  (3) Gen. 
Office of the Cent. Comm. of the CCP, Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting Yinfa, 
Guanyu Jiaqiang Xin Shidai Minying Jingji Tongzhan Gongzuo de Yijian [中共中央办公
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While the obligation to set a Party Committee even in entirely 
privately-held listed firms was emphasized in the recent 
amendment to the Code of Corporate Governance,213 the scope of its 
responsibilities and corporate governance mandates within such 
listed firms is still largely vague.214  But while there are indications 
that Party Committees’ involvement in the process of decision-
making is more limited in these firms,215 there is no doubt that the 
Party is asserting itself a greater role in supervising them, 
monitoring the behavior of their insiders (and other private market 
players), and strengthening their “law obedience,” as well as 
enlisting private businesses’ help in anti-corruption work. 216 
2. Increased Enforcement and Accountability 
Assisted by its intra-firm Party Committee, the CCP’s 
disciplinary bodies can use the corporate group structure to leverage 
their detection efforts and expose potential violations not only in 
firms within the corporate group but also in affiliated enterprises, 
some of which completely private. 
Particularly interesting is the use of business holding groups to 
expose corrupt Party-state officials and corporate insiders.  In 
examining the ways that the corporate group is being utilized to 
 
厅印发、关于加强新时代民营经济统战工作的意见 ] (The CCP Opinions on 
Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in a New Era) (Sept. 15, 
2020), [hereinafter “United Front Work Opinions”] 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6PZX-PH74].  Article 3(6), for example, calls to “ . . . further 
strengthen the Party building work of private enterprises and sincerely give full 
play to the role of Party organizations”; Article 5(17) adds the importance 
of“[e]ncourag[ing] private enterprises to participate in the reform of mixed 
ownership” and “[g]uid[ing] private enterprises to improve their corporate 
governance structure and explore the establishment of a modern corporate system 
with Chinese characteristics . . . .”  Id., arts. 3(6), 5(7). 
 213 See discussion supra note 197-198. 
 214 The various policies aimed at the private sector, supra note 212, mainly use 
a non-obligatory rhetoric, commonly using words such as “guide,” “encourage,” 
and “explore ways to.” 
 215 See, e.g., Yu-Hsin Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 199 (finding wide variations 
between the types of firms and the adopted scope of Party involvement in 
governance, with politically connected private firms adopting more Party building 
decision-making provisions that non-connected firms). 
 216 See, e.g., Arts. 2, 9, 12-14 in the Opinions on Entrepreneurs; Arts. 4, 19, 26, 
12 in the Opinions on Private Enterprises; and Arts. 3(9), 4(13), 5(18), 6(21) in the 
United Front Work Opinions, supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
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facilitate work against corruption, the following pattern seems 
common:  the CCDI starts its probe with a “disciplinary tour,” 
during which it dispatches investigators into a specific state-
controlled holding group and presumably activates the Party 
Committees within firms in a systematic search for corruption 
(“crackdown” in the media).  The “evidence” collected leads to the 
investigations of several subsidiaries within the group and its 
affiliates, including private firms.  The investigation includes 
interrogations of corporate employees, individual business 
affiliates, and corporate insiders.  The primary targets are often 
high-level public figures with parallel business positions at the 
group, yet many lower-level management and officials are also 
removed during such probes. 
In this way, the Party utilizes the corporate form and the 
prevalent group holding structure to gain access to information and 
to detect, punish, and deter against corruption and corporate 
wrongdoing more generally.  By harnessing corporations, the CCP 
strengthens conformity with its political-disciplinary standards but 
also detects corporate malfeasance.  Importantly, this process may 
or may not result in legal accountability.  Thus, while these 
alternative mechanisms show that corruption and corporate 
wrongdoing are not without accountability and may benefit 
investors through greater monitoring and increased discipline, the 
accountability that this process brings for corporate wrongdoing is 
political accountability.  Recourse for injured investors is not part of 
the process unless the process leads to further criminal or 
administrative legal proceedings.  Future empirical research could 
provide data on how many CCDI corporate corruption cases result 
in criminal prosecution and whether or not they trigger follow up 
investigations by the CSRC that end up remedying investors’ loss. 
ii. Examples 
Examples of the above can be seen in the targeted probes against 
one of China’s most valuable sectors—energy.  By targeting two of 
its most important corporate groups, the CCDI opened a hornet’s 
nest that led to the exposure and punishment (in some cases, both 
disciplinary and legal enforcement) of several corrupt Party 
members and state officials at the national and local levels, as well 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/1
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as senior business executives.217  One of the cases is that of Jiang 
Jiemin, who rose through the ranks of the oil industry to head 
China’s biggest oil business, China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), 218 and was appointed as the head of SASAC.  The pursuit 
of Jiang (which some opined was motivated by his ties with Zhou 
Yongkang, a political rival of Xi) 219  involved the detention, 
investigation, and prosecution of dozens of senior managers in the 
parent holding company CNPC, its listed subsidiary PetroChina, 
whose shares trade in the stock exchanges of New York, Shanghai, 
and Hong Kong, and even in some of its affiliated private firms for 
corruption and corporate wrongdoing.220 
A similar inspection was initiated thereafter into another of 
China’s centrally controlled energy champions, Petroleum and 
Chemicals Corporation (Sinopec Group) and its main listed 
subsidiary, Sinopec Corp. Ltd., traded in the stock exchanges of 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, New York, and London.  The inspection into 
Sinopec Group led to the detention of managers in several 
 
 217  Meng, supra note 191; Former China Energy Chief Jiang Jiemin Jailed for 
Corruption, BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
china-34503469 [https://perma.cc/A92N-UZE5] (presenting a “family tree” style 
illustration of the cases involved in this investigation into the oil industry). 
 218 Jeremy Page, Wayne Ma & Brian Spegele, China Probes Former Oil Company 
Head, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 2:56 AM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-probes-former-oil-company-head-
1378018593 [https://perma.cc/6U36-5HF7]. 
 219 Willy Lam, With Zhou’s Circle Down, Xi’s Purge May Turn to Hu, CHINA 
BRIEF, July 3, 2014, at 3. 
 220 The proceedings against private affiliated firms are worth noting since they 
instigated from, and likely rely on, evidence obtained during the political 
disciplinary enforcement process.  Donny Kwok & Charlie Zhu, PetroChina Supplier 
Wison says Records Seized, can’t Contact Chairman,  REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2013, 8:49 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-wison-cfo-idUKBRE98I01120130919 
[https://perma.cc/UY79-NY9B] (in which the chairman and subsidiary executives 
of HK-listed private firm Wison Engineering Services Co., Ltd., a major supplier of 
PetroChina, were investigated as part of the corruption investigation in PetroChina 
and its parent company CNPC).  In March 2014, Wison’s founder, primary 
shareholder, and chairman of the board was formally arrested.  He was accused of 
conspiracy to commit a “tender-offer fraud,” as well as offering bribes to state 
officials.  In August 2015, he was found guilty of offering bribes.  Brian Spegele & 
Wayne Ma, Wison Engineering Says Chinese Police Arrested Chairman, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 10, 2014, 11:45 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wison-engineering-
chairman-hua-bangsong-was-arrested-by-chinese-authorities-1394425858 
[https://perma.cc/N5W9-AHBQ]; PetroChina Supplier Wison says Found Guilty of 
Bribery in China, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2015, 9:41 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/wison-petrochina-idUSL3N10H08120150806 
[https://perma.cc/ZN4U-L4AL]. 
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subsidiary firms, 221  finally reaching the president of the group, 
Wang Tianpu.  Wang, who chaired the Group’s board at the time 
and was also the general manager of its listed subsidiary, was put 
under Party disciplinary proceedings for taking bribes and for abuse 
of power.  Wang was removed from his corporate positions, 
expelled from the Communist Party, and eventually prosecuted 
under the criminal law.222   
Similar recent probe targets include commercial and investment 
vehicles operating off-shore (state-controlled as well as private),223 
 
 221  For instance, Xue Wandong, the vice-chairman and CEO of Sinopec 
Oilfield Services Corp., was detained and investigated by the CCDI and dismissed 
from his role in Sinopec immediately.  See Hornby, supra note 192. 
 222  Zhongyang Zhongguo Shihua Dangzu Guanyu Xunshi Zhenggai 
Qingkuang Tongbao [中共中国石化党组关于巡视整改情况的通报] (Circular of the 
Chinese Communist Party on the Inspection and Ratification in China Petroleum 
Chemical Corporations) (promulgated by the CCDI, Apr. 30, 2015), 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201504/t20150430_55638.html 
[https://perma.cc/CZ5C-JEV4]; Zhongguo Shiyouhuagong Jituangongsi 
Zongjingli Wang Tianpu Shexian Yanzhong Weijiweifa Jieshou Zuzhi Diaocha [中
国石油化工集团公司总经理王天普涉嫌严重违纪违法接受组织调查] (Notice by the 
CCDI on the Disciplinary Investigation of Wang Tianpu, April) (promulgated by 
the CCDI, Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201504/ 
t20150427_55436.html [https://perma.cc/K7C9-82VP]; Zhongguo Shiyou 
Huagong Jituangongsi Yuan Dongshi, Zongjingli, Dangzuchengyuan Wang 
Tianpu Yanzhong Weiji bei Kaichu Dangji [中国石油化工集团公司原董事、总经理
、党组成员王天普严重违纪被开除党籍] (Notice by the CCDI on Wang Tianpu’s 
Expulsion from the Party, September) (promulgated by the CCDI, Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201509/t20150918_62038.html 
[https://perma.cc/7Z3T-T4BS].  For a discussion on the subsequent legal criminal 
prosecution, see China to prosecute former top executives for alleged 
graft, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2016, 5:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-corruption-sinopec-idUSKCN11W0VX [https://perma.cc/X7TV-VQJE]. 
 223 One example of an investigation of a state-owned offshore commercial firm 
is the case of Song Lin, the former chairman of China Resources, a Hong Kong based 
trading company and one of China’s largest state-owned enterprises, who was 
accused of power abuse in corporate dealings and was arrested in April 2014.  Lin 
was removed from his positions in the firm and the Party.  Two years later, he was 
charged under the criminal law.  James T. Areddy & Laurie Burkitt, China 
Communist Party Ousts Chairman of Major State-Owned Firm, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 22, 
2014, 1:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/communist-party-fires-song-lin-
chairman-of-china-resources-holdings-as-corruption-fight-expands-1398187916 
[https://perma.cc/F947-HPEU]; Choi Chi-yuk, Song Lin, Former Chairman of China 
Resources, is Formally Charged with Corruption, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 8, 2016 
1:08 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/2052971/song-lin-former-chairman-china-resources-formally 
[https://perma.cc/D5XU-TQWQ].  For other examples of SOE executives 
investigated for corruption and released from their corporate role, see 9 Chinese 
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as well as the financial sector where measures have been taken to 
dispatch CCDI teams within financial SOE conglomerates to 
function “just like . . . surveillance cameras.”224 
Some recent cases against ostensibly private firms, such as 
Dalian Wanda, Fosun International, HNA Group, and Anbang 
Insurance, emphasize how Party-led disciplinary enforcement 
influences and determines the operations of state enforcement 
actions in the private sector as well.  These cases reflect that a CCDI 
investigation has ripple effects throughout the investigated group 
and its web of affiliates.  They also reflect that Party-led enforcement 
receives a high-level of collaboration from state institutions.  For 
example, SASAC, CSRC, and the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission assisted in confiscating documents, freezing bank 
accounts, stopping the trade in shares of firms under investigation, 
and other measures.225  This assistance is given even before the case 
formally reaches the legal system. 
The above examples reflect how the ways in which the Party-
state operates with respect to corruption has blurred the lines 
between political anti-corruption discipline and legal enforcement 
against corporate wrongdoing. 
iii. Sticks of Party Presence—Positive Market Effects 
While the risks of political intervention are rather 
straightforward and recognized, 226  and the long-term economic 
effects are still to be seen, it is important to set forth the potential 
positive externalities of this foreground of illiberal corporate 
governance.  The sticks of Party presence increase regularity in the 
market and may improve investors’ confidence. 
 
 224 William Zheng, Anti-corruption Teams to be Installed at China’s State Banks 
and Insurance Companies, Acting like ‘Human Surveillance Cameras,’ S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Nov. 6, 2018 9:35 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2171994/anti-corruption-
teams-be-installed-chinas-state-banks-insurance [https://perma.cc/3WFS-7ZB9]. 
 225 Id.  Wison Engineering Services Co Ltd. bank accounts were frozen, and the 
trade in its shares was suspended.  See also, Lucy Hornby et al., Big China Companies 
Targeted over ‘Systemic Risk’, FIN. TIMES (June 23, 2017),  
https://www.ft.com/content/23c8ba54-5710-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f 
[https://perma.cc/V9TF-8S22] (reporting that the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission had instructed banks to gather information on credit exposure) 
 226 See Groswald Ozery, supra note 76, at 61-62. 
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One of the clearest positive externalities of more stringent 
disciplinary enforcement against corporate corruption is the 
removal of bad managers from Chinese firms.  Anti-corruption tour 
inspections in corporate groups could also decrease the number and 
scope of undesirable related-party transactions, which are extremely 
frequent within SOE business groups.227 
A 2020 study examined the characteristics of the firms 
investigated between 2012 and 2019 as part of the anti-corruption 
campaign.  The study constructed a sample of over 400 Chinese 
listed firms where top executives were investigated.  The authors 
found that firms with characteristics that are commonly associated 
with poor governance, such as self-dealing and inefficiencies, were 
more likely to be investigated.  This suggests that the anti-corruption 
campaign has enforcement spillovers on corporate wrongdoing 
more broadly and indeed captures firms with weak governance.228 
Having the CCP directly involved in corporate inspections can 
also raise the overall level of compliance, by creating fear 
governance with possible deterrence effects on additional forms of 
corporate misconduct, such as self-dealing, waste, and fraud, 
throughout the firm and its network of affiliates.229 
Other studies examined the broad market effects of anti-
corruption work.  One study found that the anti-corruption 
campaign has a positive effect on the ability of small entrepreneurial 
firms to grow and compete, citing its contribution to entrepreneurial 
market-entry and more efficient allocation of resources as positive 
factors. 230   Another study linked CCDI investigations with the 
 
 227 See supra notes 69, 82, and 83. 
 228 John M. Griffin et al., Is the Chinese Anti-Corruption Campaign Authentic? 
Evidence from Corporate Investigations (June 7, 2020) (paper presented at the 29th 
Annual Conference on Financial Economics & Accounting 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2779429 [https://perma.cc/RZ8M-
RLHV].  Notwithstanding these results, the authors find little evidence that there is 
a broad decrease in corporate corruption indictors.  Id.  They evaluate that the 
campaign did not lead to overall improvement in corporate governance outside 
certain behaviors, nor resulted in greater information transparency.  Id. 
 229 For the indirect effect of sanctions on non-punished peer firms in China, 
see Francesco D’Acunto et al., Punish One, Teach a Hundred: The Sobering Effect of 
Punishment on the Unpunished (University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for 
Economics, Working Paper No. 2019-12, 2019), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-
content/uploads/BFI_WP_201912.pdf [https://perma.cc/W89Z-6NQ7]. 
 230 Mariassunta Giannetti et al., The Externalities of Corruption: Evidence from 
Entrepreneurial Firms in China (European Corporate Governance Institute, Finance 
Working Paper No. 536/2017,  2020), 
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availability of credit.  The authors posit that anti-corruption 
enforcement reallocates credit from less productive SOEs to more 
productive non-SOEs.231 
Sticks of Party presence could also have a positive market-
signaling effect.  As discussed, the primary concern of public 
investors in China today is not the expropriation of their property 
rights by the Party-state, but rather their abuse by corporate insiders 
and rogue officials.  The politicization of corporate governance may 
signal to investors that the Party-state is committed to economic 
growth and that self-dealing and corruption are now kept at bay by 
a strict enforcer. 
Two recent studies tracked cumulative abnormal returns of 
Chinese listed firms following different announcements related to 
anti-corruption work.  The results show that the overall stock market 
responses to announcements of CCDI inspections were significantly 
positive.232   One of these studies looked at firms that are listed both 
in China and on the Hong Kong stock exchange, concluding that the 
expectation of reduced corruption adds value to listed firms overall 
in both markets.233  A third study examined the effect of the anti-
 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897558 
[https://perma.cc/ZCQ2-UBHR] (finding: (1) “entertainment expenses”—a 
common measure of potential corruption and a way for control parties to siphon 
private benefits of control— in big firms decreased following Xi’s anti-corruption 
campaign; (2) anti-corruption measures have alleviated barriers for small 
businesses and made it easier for them to compete; and (3) following Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign, state subsidies for R&D became significantly positively 
associated with future innovation, meaning higher innovative efficiency and lower 
influence of corruption-related expenditures); Mariassunta Giannetti & Xiaoyun 
Yu, The Impact of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign on Small and Incumbent Firms 
in China, CEPR (Oct. 30, 2017), https://voxeu.org/article/anti-corruption-and-
entrepreneurial-activity-china [https://perma.cc/TUK2-DL8Z]. 
 231 Bo Li et al., China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Credit Reallocation from 
SOEs to Non-SOEs (PBCSF-NIFR, Research Paper No. 17-01, 2017, rev’d July 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2908658 
[https://perma.cc/9PTB-Y5G6]. 
 232  Haoyuan Ding et al., Equilibrium Consequences of Corruption on Firms: 
Evidence from China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (Jan. 2020) (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 26656, 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26656/w26656.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9LY5-NQS2]. 
 233 Chen Lin et al., What Do We Learn from Stock Price Reactions to China’s First 
Announcement of Anti-Corruption Reforms? (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper No. 22001, 2016, rev’d Aug. 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22001/w22001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B5ES-N2L3].  The study also identified different impact levels 
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corruption campaign on market reaction concerning what the 
authors call “relational spending” (measured by business 
entertainment expenses).  The authors found a weaker effect of 
relational spending on share-price crash risk following the anti-
corruption campaign.  They posited that the anti-corruption 
campaign reduced information opacity and minimized investors’ 
perception of risks from relational spending, concluding that the 
campaign contributes to corporate monitoring. 234 
In this sense, political institutions are filling a signaling role in 
an environment where publicly disclosed information is limited and 
unreliable.235 
It is still too early to decisively determine how the various 
corporate governance roles of the CCP will be implemented in 
different firms and sectors and what would be their relative long-
term effects. 236  The impact on the long-term availability of public 
finance is thus still to be seen. 
Nonetheless, the analysis above suggests that at least with 
respect to enhanced monitoring and enforcement, the corporate 
capacity of the CCP has positive market effects and potential 
contributions to firm value. 
In the Chinese context, therefore, an illiberal and even politicized 
corporate governance deploys both carrots and sticks that improve 
market regularity and provide the assurances needed for investors 
to continue supplying capital. 
 
depending on prior market liberalization.  Id.  Firms in capital markets that are 
better set to allocating recourses efficiently experienced higher cumulative 
abnormal returns.  Id. 
 234 Hu et al., Corporate Relationship Spending and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence 
from China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, 113 J. BANKING & FIN. 1, 8 (2019). 
 235 This is somewhat similar to how in twentieth-century Japan, monitoring 
by reputable industrialists recruited to the boards of Japanese firms compensated 
for informational inefficiencies in the Japanese market.  Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark 
Ramseyer, The Value of Prominent Directors: Corporate Governance and Bank Access in 
Transitional Japan, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 273-5 (2002). 
 236 The empirical task is complicated as each element in the politicization of 
corporate governance could produce different market results.  The impact of the 
CCP’s increased monitoring in firm would need to be off set against the impact of 
other Party building elements (e.g., its relative involvement in corporate decision 
making across industries and ownership structures).  For an attempt to observe 
market reactions to the CCP’s Party building efforts in firms, see Lauren Yu-Hsin 
Lin et al., Political Influence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Party-Building 
Reform in China (Dec. 21, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3510002 
[https://perma.cc/QFW9-MFY7] (observing market reaction following 
announcements on party-building policies as well as in response to subsequent 
charter amendments.). 
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As a side note, it is interesting to mention that the anti-
corruption campaign has another, more surprising, externality.  It 
seems to have an effect on the corporate conduct of multinational 
U.S. firms!237   A recent U.S. SEC report found a surge in China-
domiciled whistle-blowers with respect to misconduct in 
multinational and U.S. firms, which some suggested was affected by 
China’s anti-corruption efforts. 238   Thus, illiberal corporate 
governance in China could even be contributing to the 
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform.  This effect 
on foreign-domiciled firms and investors outside of China indicates 
additional positive externalities of China’s governance methods that 
are completely disregarded. 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 
Over the past decade, concerns about China’s corporate 
governance practices and the potential risks for U.S. investors 
started gaining the attention of policymakers in the United States.239  
 
 237 Matthew S. Erie, Anticorruption as Transnational Law: The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, PRC Law, and Party Rules in China, AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2971092 [https://perma.cc/U4JF-F5XA]. (discussing 
how the overlapping systems of anti-corruption in the United States and China 
form a transnational law compliance system). 
 238 Andy Rickman, How China and the US Are Emboldening Whistle-Blowers in 




 239 Regulatory attention to matters of corporate governance in China started 
gaining steam in 2007 when Chinese and Hong Kong audit firms first refused to 
grant access to data about China-based U.S. issuers that was requested in the 
process of U.S. audit inspections.  The PCAOB issued an audit quality alert, 
expressing concerns about the quality of audits in such firms.  Staff Audit Practice 
Alert No. 6, PUB. CO. ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., July 12, 2010, 
https://pcaobus.org/Standards/QandA/2010-07-12_APA_6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6PNT-7P6M].  Following a series of fraud allegations in China-
based reverse merger listed firms, several insiders of China-based listed firms were 
charged with securities fraud, and administrative processing were taken against the 
Chinese local branches of the “big four” accounting firms for refusing to produce 
relevant audit work papers.  Press Release, SEC Charges China-Based Executives with 
Securities Fraud, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM., Feb. 22, 2012, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-31htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y4JQ-HFP9]; Press Release, SEC Charges China Affiliates of Big 
Four Accounting Firms with Violating U.S. Securities Law in Refusing to Produce 
Documents, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM., Dec. 3, 2012, https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2012-2012-249htm  [https://perma.cc/4XTU-B7SW]. 
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These concerns regained momentum in 2018 against the backdrop 
of the U.S.-China trade war and the escalating political pressures in 
favor of an “economic decoupling” from China.240 
Most of the attention so far was given to the risks of investing in 
Chinese firms that participate in U.S. financial markets.  Still, some 
attention is given to the potential risks for U.S. investors when they 
invest in publicly listed Chinese firms outside the U.S. market (i.e., 
investments in China’s capital market or in Chinese firms whose 
shares trade in other global exchanges).241 
Given a rising global financial integration, efforts to rethink 
investors’ interests and protections are worthy.  Markets today 
involve players and countries with different corporate governance 
regimes and economic systems.  The effects of corporate governance 
no longer flow in one direction.  Regulatory frameworks, therefore, 
cannot afford to maintain local orientation while financial markets 
are globalizing.  Increasing awareness and understanding of the 
financial risks involved in global investments is a first step. 
Yet, this cannot be fulfilled without also considering what 
attracts investors to Chinese firms and what keeps them invested 
notwithstanding those risks.  Understanding the source of investors’ 
confidence requires us to look at the full array of China’s corporate 
governance mechanisms—whether conventional or non-
conventional, market-oriented or illiberal, formal or informal.  The 
positive externalities of state capacities and political influence are 
part of the package and yet are completely disregarded in recent 
policy and academic debates. 
The regulatory steps that were taken recently reflect an 
orthodox, oversimplified view of state ownership, control, and 
political influence, and misconceptions about their full impact on 
investors, firms, and the markets in which they trade. 
 
 240 Public Companies that are Audit Clients of PCAOB-Registered Firms from Non-
U.S. Jurisdictions Where the PCAOB is Denied Access to Conduct Inspections, PUB. CO. 
ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., (updated Oct. 1, 2020), 
https://pcaobus.org/oversight/international/denied-access-to-inspections 
[https://perma.cc/ZP3E-JWL6] (noting 221 U.S. issuers where the PCAOB was 
experiencing obstacles in inspecting the auditor’s work); Statement from Jay 
Clayton et al., Statement on the Vital Role of Audit Quality and Regulatory Access to 
Audit and Other Information Internationally—Discussion of Current Information Access 
Challenges with Respect to U.S.-listed companies with Significant Operations in China, 
U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM., (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/statement-vital-role-audit-quality-and-regulatory-access-audit-and-
other#_ftn1  [https://perma.cc/AC66-MCYG]. 
 241  A Congressional Commission Hearing on the subject, including my 
testimony, was held on March 19, 2021, supra note 204. 
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a. Investments in China-Based U.S. Issuers 
Policymakers’ approach to the risks of investing in China-based 
U.S. issuers has focused on the quality of disclosures by issuers,242 
and the inability of U.S. regulators to oversee their audit works and 
execute judgments243 due to limitations enshrined in PRC law.244  
Most recently, in December 2020, Congress stepped in and enacted 
the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCA Act, or the 
Act). 245   The Act parts away from a financial risk disclosure 
approach and instead requires China-based issuers, through their 
auditors, to comply with U.S. auditing oversight rules or be delisted 
from trade. 
Following the Act, the SEC is required to identify all U.S.-
reporting issuers whose financial statements were audited by 
registered accounting firms with an office or a branch in a foreign 
jurisdiction, and which the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB)246 is unable to inspect due to limitations imposed by 
the authorities of such foreign jurisdiction.247  With respect to such 
identified issuer, if the SEC will determine that the PCAOB is not 
able to inspect the issuer’s audits for three consecutive years, the 
SEC would be required to prohibit trade in its securities.248 
 
 242  Disclosure Considerations for China-Based Issuers, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM., 
(Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/disclosure-considerations-china-
based-issuers  [https://perma.cc/RC3C-9SES]. 
 243  Clayton et al., supra note 240; Statement from Clayton et al., Emerging 
Market Investments Entail Significant Disclosure, Financial Reporting and Other Risks; 
Remedies are Limited, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM. (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/emerging-market-investments-
disclosure-reporting [https://perma.cc/JT8U-YDKT]. 
 244 For PRC laws and practices restricting access to information maintained in 
China, see Huang, Robin Hui, The US-China Audit Oversight Dispute: Causes, 
Solutions, and Implications for Hong Kong, INT’L LAWYER (forthcoming 2021) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3708068 [https://perma.cc/S3FE-YUN4]; Fried and 
Kamar, supra note 44, pp. 11-19. 
 245 The Bill introducing the HFCA was approved by the Senate in May 2020 
and by the House of Representatives in December 2020.  It was signed into law on 
Dec. 18, 2020.  See S. 945, 116th Cong. (2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/945/text 
[https://perma.cc/5FZP-KUTX]. 
 246 The PCAOB oversees the accounting profession in the United States by 
establishing auditing standards for public accounting firms and is responsible for 
inspecting registered accounting firms and their audit of U.S. issuers. 
 247  HFCA, supra note 245, § 2 (i) (2)(A). 
 248  HFCA, supra note 245, § 2 (i) (3). 
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Since the ability of China-based issuers and their auditors to 
cooperate with U.S. auditing work inspection requirements is 
confined by PRC laws,249 compliance with the Act would compel 
them to violate PRC law.  China is unlikely to amend its laws in 
response to the Act.  Commentators, therefore, believe that the Act 
would result in a broad delisting of China-based U.S. issuers which 
would cause economic losses to their investors.250  Chinese firms will 
be pushed to go private or seek finance elsewhere.251  U.S. investors 
will either miss out on good investment opportunities or will find 
ways to invest in Chinese firms through other, less regulated, and 
thus lesser protective markets. 
Alternatively, China-based issuers that wish to remain in the 
U.S. market while complying with Chinese laws would be forced to 
seek approval from the Chinese government to disclosure 
information.  The Act, therefore, will have the unintended result of 
increasing the dependency of these firms on the Chinese 
government.  China’s Party-state will now be able to veto which 
China-based firms remain listed on U.S. exchanges.  
Aside from these potential implications, the Act does not stop 
there.  Curiously, the Act is imbued with confusing provisions that 
try to identify government ownership and political influence over 
China-based issuers: 
Apart from a potential delisting sanction, the Act requires 
issuers identified by the SEC as described above to submit 
documentation that show that the issuer is not owned or controlled 
 
 249 See, supra note 244. 
 250 See, e.g., Jesse Fried & Matthew J. Schoenfeld, Delisting Chinese Firms: A 
Cure Likely Worse than the Disease, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM CORP. GOV., (June 9, 
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/09/delisting-chinese-firms-a-
cure-likely-worse-than-the-disease/ [https://perma.cc/62UT-EXAZ]; Dave 
Michaels & Alexander Osipovich, Congress Sets Stage for Exiling Chinese Stocks from 
U.S. over Audit Dispute, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 2, 2020 5:58 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-sets-stage-for-exiling-chinese-stocks-
from-u-s-over-audit-dispute-11606946071 [https://perma.cc/99CA-KVUW].  
Note, however, the Act does leave discretion to the SEC in determining its inability 
to inspect an issuer.  There thus could be room for the SEC to avoid automatic 
delisting and establish auditing cooperation with the CSRC, determining the 
PCAOB’s “inability to inspect” on such basis.  HFCA, supra note 245, § 2 (i)(3)(A). 
 251  Eleven going-private transactions and ten secondary listings of China-
based U.S. issuers, including Alibaba, JD.com, NetEase, have been put to process 
over the past year.   China’s global financial integration makes finance from other 
markets readily available.  Joanne Chiu & Frances Yoon, Ahead of U.S. Audit Bill, 
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by a government entity in the foreign jurisdiction where its financial 
statements were audited. 252 
If the issuer identified by the SEC as described above is also a 
“U.S. foreign issuer,” 253  it is required to disclose the following 
additional information in its reports for each year during which the 
PCAOB is unable to inspect:254 
1) The percentage of shares owned by government entities 
where the issuer is incorporated or “otherwise organized” 
(presumably, referring to its registered domicile); 
2) Whether government entities in the foreign jurisdiction where 
the registered public accounting firm has a branch that audit the 
issuer’s financial reporting, have a controlling financial interest in 
the issuer; 
3) The name of each CCP official who is a member of the board 
of directors of the issuer, or of its affiliated Chinese operating entity; 
4) Whether the organizing document of the issuer (i.e., articles of 
association, bylaws) contains any “charter” of the CCP and the text 
of such charter. 
The purpose and the added value of these disclosure 
requirements for investors are not clear, especially given that fraud 
cases in China-based U.S. issuers so far did not involve state-owned 
companies.  The consequences for issuers as well are unspecified. 
First, concerning state capacities—the Act does not define 
“control by a government,” nor what having a “controlling financial 
interests” means in the case of foreign issuers.  The U.S. Securities 
Act and the Exchange Act define “control” as “the possession, direct 
or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the 
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership 
of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”255  
An approach that looks beyond formal share ownership to 
establish control is appropriate.  As seen throughout this Article, in 
many respects the state in China possesses the power to direct 
companies in a variety of means that extend beyond the state’s 
 
 252 This is a simplification of the text.  For original text, see HCFA, supra note 
245, § 2 (i)(2)(A). 
 253 For definition, see supra note 35. 
 254 HFCA, supra note 245, § 3(b). 
 255 Securities Act of 1933, Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405; Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (emphasis added) (defining “control,” including 
the terms ”controlling,” “controlled by,” and ”under common control with”). 
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ownership capacity (though this may be true for governments 
anywhere).256 
Nonetheless, employing the above definition of control in the 
case of government control would enable an overly broad 
interpretation that could result in any and all China-based issuers 
considered to be controlled by the PRC government. 
While the state in principle possesses the power to direct 
companies outside its shareholding capacity, it does not necessarily 
do so.  Even in its shareholding capacity, where it is not a controlling 
shareholder by PRC law definition, 257  and aside from specific 
decisions for which the state has boosted rights even as a non-
controlling investor,258 the PRC government seems inclined to stay 
away from significant involvement.  Various policy measures and 
regulations were put in place to limit the state’s (and the Party’s) 
intervention, in its shareholding capacity, in day-to-day decision 
making where it does not hold significant voting rights.259  As noted 
earlier, the lack of exercising the state’s shareholder capacity 
enabled the phenomena of insiders’ control in Chinese firms.260 
From an investor’s perspective, applying to China-based firms a 
broad interpretation of “control” that looks at the possession of the 
power to direct the firm, as in the existing definition of control above, 
might wrongfully lead investors to believe that the issuer’s day-to-
day decisions are indeed routinely directed by the Chinese 
government. 
There ought to be a reconceptualization of what control means 
with respect to governments and a refining of what circumstances 
of exercising control the Act seeks to prevent.  Hopefully,  the SEC 
would add clarity in subsequent rules.261 
Second, concerning the Act’s requirements for disclosure of the 
presence of the CCP in the issuer:  the recent Party building efforts 
and its pronounced goal to institutionalize its presence in firms 
 
 256  On the state’s share ownership and control through organizational 
structures, see supra Part III.A.2.  On control in other means of state capacity, see 
supra Part IV.A. 
 257 For the definition, see supra note 92. 
 258 For instances where the state has “boosted” shareholders rights even as a 
minority investor see, supra notes 93, 94. 
 259 See Groswald Ozery, USCC Testimony, supra note 204. 
 260 Supra Part III.A. 
 261 HFCA, supra note 245, § 2 (i)(2)(B) (requiring the SEC to issue, within ninety 
days of enactment, rules that clarify the forms by which a relevant issuer can 
established that it is not owned or controlled by a government entity in the foreign 
jurisdiction where its financial statements were audited). 
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clearly show that the Party-state is not trying to conceal the CCP’s 
place in the market but rather to own it.  As long as it is clear that an 
issuer is based in China (operating assets and/or insiders based in 
China), investors can assume that the CCP has some scope of 
influence on the firm even without having this disclosed on U.S. 
exchange platforms.  Foreign institutional investors indeed seem to 
have assumed such presence and considered it in their risk 
assessments even before the push in recent years to formalize it 
further.262 
The proxies used in the Act to ascertain potential Party influence 
are enigmatic.  Potential Party influence cannot be assessed based 
solely on what is indicated by conventional corporate governance 
institutions.  For example, who are “Party officials” on the board for 
the purposes of the Act?  Are these members of the board that also 
receive a salary from the CCP?  Party committee members, for 
example, are often paid by the firm itself (perhaps with some 
operative allowances from a higher supervising Party organization).  
What about board members with membership in one of the political 
organizations at the behest of the CCP that are not also “Party 
officials” (e.g., members of the Communist Youth Lead or the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions)?  What about former Party 
officials on the board?  The Act seems to assume that the lines of 
CCP influence on boards are determined by existing officialdom 
status.  The reality is much more complex.263 
Similarly, having provisions that set up the CCP’s corporate 
presence formally included in the firm’s organizing documents is 
indeed an indication of the CCP’s direct influence.  Yet not having 
these formal recognition does not mean that they do not exist.  Even 
according to PRC law, only state-controlled listed companies (and 
other SOEs) are required to formally change their bylaws to reflect 
the corporate capacities of their Party organization,264 while private 
listed firms are required to set up CCP corporate capacity without 
an obligation to amend their bylaws to that fact.265 
 
 262 Supra notes 58, 209, 211, 212. 
 263 Supra notes 79, 167, 168, and the sources therein. 
 264 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 110, art. 5: “A state-controlled 
listed company shall, according to the Company law and relevant provisions and 
in consideration of its equity structure, operation, management and other reality, 
include the relevant requirements for the Party building work in the bylaws.”  For 
other SOEs, see SOE Reform Guiding Opinion, supra note 200, art. 24. 
 265 See supra discussion in Part IV.B.i.1, particularly notes 202, 204, 208, 211. 
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As a side note, the Act stops short of requiring a similar 
disclosure about the existence of a “CCP charter” in the organizing 
documents of the issuer’s affiliated Chinese operating entity.266  If 
there is any benefit from such disclosure, it should have included 
disclosure concerning the operating entity as well. 
As this Article has shown, the CCP exerts a variety of corporate 
governance capacities over Chinese firms in ways that are not 
confined by conventional institutions of corporate governance and 
are thus not reflected only by the indications required by the Act. 
In short, the scope of the Party-state actual influence on 
corporate decision making will not be made any clearer by a 
disclosure to the fact that it formally exists.  Investors are not 
expected to gain any new insights on the financial risks of such 
issuers by having such details disclosed the way they are currently 
stipulated in the Act. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, from an investors’ 
perspective, Chinese state ownership and control, and even political 
presence, do not seem to be a main source of concern.  Investors are 
not deterred by China’s illiberal corporate governance.  Quite the 
contrary, as the analysis in this Article suggests, alongside its 
obstructions, illiberal corporate governance deploys mechanisms 
that secure investors’ expectations and increase their confidence in 
the market.  Investors, and particularly sophisticated foreign 
institutional investors, find assurances in the same attributes that 
U.S. legislators seem averse to. 
Any policy that attempts to assess the financial risks for 
investors and to better safeguard their interests has to account for 
the full impact of China’s illiberal corporate governance on 
investors’ sentiments. 
It is of course possible that the HFCA Act and particularly the 
obscure disclosure requirements emanate from other considerations 
that are outside the scope of investor protection. 
As I detail next, indications outside the HFCA Act suggest that 
these disclosure requirements indeed have little to do with concerns 
for investors and more to do with the U.S. administration’s 
redefining the breadth of its strategic competition with China.  If the 
concerns that motivate these disclosure requirements are indeed 
outside the interests of investors, it is questionable whether the SEC 
 
 266  As seen supra notes 210-216, the CCP is establishing presence in an 
increasingly growing number of Chinese firms and can impact U.S. issuers through 
such operating entities. 
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is the most appropriate body to define the boundaries of state 
control and to assess the scope of potential influence by the CCP. 
b. Global Investments by U.S. Investors in Chinese Firms 
In a series of recent steps, the U.S. administration acted to limit 
U.S. investments in Chinese firms even outside U.S. financial 
markets.267 
An SEC roundtable was formed to examine “the risks of 
investing in emerging markets,” including China.268  In preparation, 
the SEC issued a risk analysis report alerting about the level of 
exposure of U.S. investors to China’s domestic capital market,269 
noting particularly the rising scope of mutual funds and state-level 
public pension funds’ exposure to China through indices that track 
Chinese companies A share market.270 
Paralleling this, a Presidential Working Group was assembled 
and tasked to examine risks to investors in U.S. financial markets 
related to China-based issuers.271  Its resulting recommendations, 
however, extend beyond such mandate and address potential risks 
to U.S. public investors through their exposure to Chinese issuers 
outside U.S. financial markets.  The Presidential Working Group’s 
recommendations urged the SEC to take steps to increase investors’ 
awareness of the potential risks of investing in China (and in other 
 
 267 Pressuring retirement funds that manage pension accounts of government 
employees to pull-back from their investments in China’s capital market.  See Ana 
Swanson, Federal Retirement Fund Halts Planned China Investment Under Pressure, 
N. Y. TIMES, (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/13/business/economy/china-tsp-federal-
retirement-fund.html [https://perma.cc/22TG-AHLF]. 
 268 Spotlight on Risks for Investors in Emerging Markets, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM’N 
(modified Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/page/emerging-markets-
roundtable [https://perma.cc/Z7NY-VVYV]. 
 269  U.S. Investors’ Exposure to Domestic Chinese Issuers, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM’N 
5-10 (July 6, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/US-Investors-Exposure-to-
Domestic-Chinese-Issuers_2020.07.06.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJL2-D6SS]. 
 270 Id. at 5.  For explanation on the different share types see, supra note 20. 
 271  The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets: Report on Protecting 
United States Investors from Significant Risks from Chinese Companies (July 24, 2020), 
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emerging markets, particularly in “non-cooperating jurisdictions”), 
by272: 
1) promoting enhanced risk disclosure by registered investment 
funds that have portfolio exposure to issuers from China; 
2) encouraging or requiring registered funds that track indices 
to conduct more robust due diligence of index providers prior to the 
selection of the index for investment; and, 
3) issuing guidance to investment advisers with respect to their 
fiduciary obligations when considering investments in China (or 
other emerging markets). 
Promoting enhanced risk disclosure and more robust due 
diligence prior to making investment decisions is a balanced 
approach that focuses on investors’ interests and leaves risk 
assessment essentially in the hands of market participants. 
A more radical move, however, was taken in November 2020 
when former U.S. President Donald Trump issued an Executive 
Order to curtail retail and institutional investments in certain 
Chinese firms.  The order was issued based on such firms posing a 
“national emergency” threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States, stating that “the PRC exploits 
United States investors to finance the development and 
modernization of its military.” 273 
Following the Executive Order, effective January 11, 2021, any 
transaction by a U.S. person in publicly traded securities (including 
through derivatives and other transactions that provide investment 
exposure to such securities) of any “Communist Chinese Military 
Company” is prohibited. 274   A “Communist Chinese Military 
Company” is any person (individual or entity) that is identified by 
the U.S. Department of Defense to be owned or controlled by the 
People’s Liberation Army, and to be engaged in providing 
commercial services, manufacturing, producing, or exporting, and 
the publicly listed subsidiaries of such person.275  The list comprises 
forty-four entities so far. 276   The list does not only include pure 
 
 272 Id. at 3-4. 
 273  Exec. Order No. 13959, 85 Fed. Reg. 73,815  (Nov. 12, 2020), 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13959.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YVH2-BLG5]. 
 274 Id. at Section 1(a). 
 275 Id. at Section 4 (“Definitions”). 
 276 Press Release, Dep’t of Def., DOD Releases List of Additional Companies, In 
Accordance with Section 1237 of FY99 NDAA, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., (Jan 14, 2021), 
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defense contractors but also Chinese companies that produce 
bridges, supercomputers, video surveillance equipment, 
agrochemicals, and more.277 
Importantly, the implications of the Executive Order extend 
beyond these forty-four entities due to the prevailing group and 
network structures that characterize ownership and control in many 
Chinese business groups.278  So far, twenty-two entities from the list 
were identified to have a total of at least sixty-eight affiliates whose 
securities are included on major indices.279  The number of firms 
identified as Communist Chinese Military Companies is sure to 
grow also in light of China’s Military-Civil Fusion plan (Junmin 
ronghe).280 
Additionally, the U.S. Department of State expressed an implicit 
intent to broaden the scope of forbidden (or at least discouraged) 
public investment to investments in all Chinese entities that are 
perceived as “malign” to U.S. national interests.281  This includes 





 277 For an analysis of the entities included, see Hannah Reale, Meet the Military 
Affiliates, WIRE CHINA, (Dec. 6, 2020), 
https://www.thewirechina.com/2020/12/06/meet-the-military-affiliates/ 
[https://perma.cc/8RCJ-5V35]. 
 278  See generally Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 73 (detailing the prevailing 
ownership structures and network affiliates in China’s centrally controlled state-
owned groups). 
 279  Fact Sheet, U.S. Investors Are Funding Malign PRC Companies on Major 




 280 The Military-Civil Fusion is a PRC national development plan that enlists 
the private sector, particularly in advanced technology industries, to help 
modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA, the PRC military) through adapting 
commercial technologies for military use and developing dual-use technologies.  
See Zhongyang Junwei Guanyu Shenhua Guofang he Jundui Gaige de Yijian [中央
军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见] (Central Military Commission Opinions on 
Deepening the Reform of National Defense and the Armed Forces), XINHUA (Jan. 1, 
2016), http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PQK3-ZJNW] (the roots of the Military-Civil Fusion plan were 
likely laid in 2013, at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Party Committee, 
which emphasized modernization reform in the PLA). 
 281 See supra note 279. 
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their affiliates,282  in so far that they have issued publicly traded 
securities.283 
These blacklists have made some impact, leading several index 
providers to remove, or consider removing, certain Chinese firms 
from their indices284 and pressuring the NYSE into delisting certain 
firms.285 
In this context, the rationale behind the disclosure requirements 
in the HFCA Act becomes clearer.  Gaining more information about 
state ownership, control, and CCP capacities in U.S. issuers and their 
affiliates is likely designed to aid the difficult process of identifying 
potential national threats and substantiate future expansion of the 
blacklists.  Yet, here as well, additional disclosures about the 
operations of the issuers, their production lines, major clients, 
funding sources, operating assets, etc. are potentially more 
informative for the purposes of the Executive Order than a 
disclosure about the Party or state formal channels of corporate 
impact alone. 
These recent steps by the U.S. administration are unprecedented.  
They go beyond pushing non-compliant China-based issuers out of 
U.S. financial markets, to demanding investors to actively divest of 
Chinese firms even when they have no footing in the U.S. market.  
Doing so de facto imposes extraterritorial application of U.S. 
 
 282 The Department of Commerce Entity List prohibits the export of protected 
US technology to a list of legal persons without first obtaining a license from the US 
government, on the grounds of their engagement in sanctioned activities or in 
activities that are contrary to U.S. national security and/or foreign policy interests. 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-
concern/entity-list [https://perma.cc/V957-SW82].  The list currently includes 260 
PRC entities, including 136 companies (the rest are individuals), see Mei zai Jiang 11 
Jiazhongqi Lie ru Shiti Qingdan Zhuanjia: Bei “La Hei” hou Jiben Bu Keneng “Bian Bai” 
[美再将 11 家中企列入实体清单 专家：被”拉黑”后基本不可能”变白”] (U.S. Relists 
11 Chinese Companies on the Entity List: Can’t Be Whitened After Being Blackened), SINA 
NEWS, Jul. 21, 2020, https://news.sina.cn/2020-07-21/detail-
iivhvpwx6697428.d.html [https://perma.cc/PZP7-67AJ]. 
 283 Currently, only thirteen of the companies on the Department of Commerce 
Entity List are included or have affiliated entities that are included in the 
Department of Defense list of Communist Chinese Military Companies.  See Reale, 
supra note 277. 
 284 Reale, supra note 277. 
 285 Alan Rappeport & Paul Mozur, New York Stock Exchange Pressured to Push 
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geopolitical considerations onto financial markets’ participants,286 
prohibiting their global investments in companies that are deemed 
to have been operating in conflict with national security or foreign 
policy interests of the United States, while sidestepping their 
economic interest.  These steps are a further illustration that the lines 
between economic interests and national security interests are 
colliding, reflecting that market participants cannot remain 
independent from politics, even in liberal capitalist systems. 
It is for policymakers to decide if the ends justify the means.  Yet 
we should acknowledge that the currently chosen means embody 
the same market characteristics that antagonized U.S. policymakers 
against China all along—the politicization and advancement of 
national interests through the market at the expense of investors and 
free trade.  The system of global finance is reactively pushed further 
and further away from market liberalism. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In the past two decades, the world has witnessed China’s 
growing integration with global financial markets.  Chinese firms, 
regardless of state ownership or political control, successfully attract 
external finance both at home and abroad. 
The allure of these firms to domestic and foreign investors is 
puzzling given assumptions about the associated risks and 
prevailing theories on the role of robust investor-oriented legal 
institutions in securing public finance.  This Article explicates this 
puzzle and contributes an explanation that is grounded in the 
functions of China’s illiberal corporate governance. 
Alongside its many impediments, China’s illiberal governance 
utilizes alternative mechanisms—at both state and Party 
capacities—to ensure market regularity.  These alternative 
governance mechanisms boost market stability and discipline 
corporate insiders.  Through both carrots and sticks, such an 
alternative framework supports market growth and reassures 
investors that their reasonable expectations for returns will be met. 
China’s growing integration in the world economy alongside 
recent policy debates in favor of “economic decoupling” makes 
 
 286  ”The Chinese Communist Party’s threat to American national security 
extends into our financial markets and impacts American investors.”  U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, supra note 279. 
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understanding these corporate governance features imperative.  The 
positive externalities of illiberal corporate governance must be 
considered as well.  The task, however, is greater than assessing 
financial risks.  Only by deepening our understanding of the full 
functions of China’s illiberal governance with respect to firms and 
the market, can a suitable policy be tailored to protect the interests 
of investors and other market constituents. 
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